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HISTORICAL LINGUISTICS, INKBLOTS, AND
LIFE AFTER DEATH: THE PRIVILEGES OR
IMMUNITIES OF CITIZENS OF THE UNITED
STATES
MICHAEL KENT CURIS*
The recent Supreme Court decision of Saenz v. Roe suggests that
the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
may have a new lease on life. In this Article, Professor Curtis
examines the Clause using a method advocated by Justice Felix
Frankfurter and many others: interpreting a constitutional
amendment based on the common understanding of the words of
the amendment at the time it was proposed and debated.
Application of this method provides substantial support for the
view that the words "privileges and immunities of citizens of the
United States" include the rights of American citizens listed in the
Constitution, especially those in the Bill of Rights. This Article
looks at usage of "privileges" and "immunities" from the colonial
period through Reconstruction and uncovers many examples in
which people used the words to refer to basic protections in the
federal Bill of Rights. The search also shows that these rights,
privileges, and immunities were viewed as belonging to citizens of
the United States or to all American citizens. More recent court
opinions and a presidential proclamation also illustrate the use of
"privileges or immunities" to describe Bill of Rights protections.
Finally, the Article reflects on the problems that lie behind the
apparent superficial simplicity of appeals to original meaning.
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INTRODUCTION
On May 17, 1999, an almost unprecedented event occurred in
American constitutional law-the United States Supreme Court held
that a state statute violated the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the
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Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.' In Saenz v. Roe,
the Court ruled that the right to travel is a privilege protected by the
clause An aspect of that privilege was the right of people from out
of state to establish residence in a new state and to enjoy basic
equality with other state residents. Accordingly, the Court struck
down California's statute limiting, for one year, new state residents to
the amount of welfare payments they had received in the state from
which they had emigrated.4
It is not astonishing that the Court struck down an act of a state
legislature. The Court has done that quite often before. Nor is it
remarkable that an effort to limit the welfare benefits of migrants was
struck down. The Court also has done that before What is
remarkable is that Saenz relied on the Privileges or Immunities
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Before May 17, 1999, the
Privileges or Immunities Clause, the "[1]ost [c]lause" as Akhil Reed
Amar aptly named it,' had seemed to be defunct. After it was
eviscerated by the 1873 Slaughter-House Cases7 and in two cases
decided in 1876,8 the clause had shown few signs of life, and these
were almost exclusively in dissenting or concurring opinions.' As
1. See Saenz v. Roe, 536 U.S. 489,502-03 (1999).
2. See icL
3. See id. at 502-04.
4. See id. at 504-11.
5. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 622, 641-41 (1969) (holding that a
total one-year denial of welfare to migrants violates the Equal Protection Clause),
overruled in part by Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
6. Akhil Reed Amar, Lost Clause, NEW REPUBLIC, June 14, 1999, at 14, 14.
7. 83 U.S. (16 Wail.) 36, 80 (1873) (stating that the rights claimed by the plaintiffs
were not privileges and immunities within the meaning of that clause).
8. See United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 551-56 (1876) (suggesting that none
of the guarantees of the Bill of Rights limited the states, including the rights to assemble
and bear arms); Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U.S. 90, 92-93 (1876) (holding that the Seventh
Amendment right to a civil jury trial does not limit the states under the Fourteenth
Amendment).
9. See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 359 (1974) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting); Old Dominion Branch No. 496 v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264, 290 (1974) (Douglas,
J., concurring in the result); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 165-66 (1968) (Black, J.,
concurring); Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 77, 85 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting),
overruled in part by Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964); Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S.
454, 464-65 (1907) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581, 612, 617 (1900)
(Harlan, J., dissenting), abrogated by Williams v. Florida, 398 U.S. 78 (1970); O'Neil v.
Vermont, 144 U.S. 323, 361-66 (1892) (Field, J., dissenting); Slaughter-House Cases, 83
U.S. (16 Wall.) at 116, 118 (dicta) (Bradley, J., dissenting). In Adamson, Justice Douglas
joined Justice Black's dissent. Adamson, 332 U.S. at 92 (Black, J., dissenting). Justice
Murphy, joined by Justice Rutledge, dissented separately. See id. at 123 (Murphy, J.,
dissenting). Justice Murphy noted that he was in "substantial agreement" with Black, but
added "one reservation and one addition." Id (Murphy, J., dissenting).
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Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote in his Saenz dissent, "The Court today
breathes new life into the previously dormant Privileges or
Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment-a Clause relied
upon by this Court in only one other decision, Colgate v. Harvey ...
overruled five years later by Madden v. Kentucky .... "10 Some
scholars had sought to drive nails in the coffin. In 1990, Robert Bork
announced that the Privileges or Immunities Clause was
indecipherable, like a provision obliterated beyond recovery by an
inkblot: "That clause has been a mystery since its adoption and in
consequence has, quite properly, remained a dead letter.""
In the 1873 Slaughter-House Cases, the Court deprived the clause
of virtually all meaning, but-as the opinion in Saenz shows-not
quite all. In Saenz, the Court cited dicta from the Slaughter-House
Cases to support its conclusion. As the Saenz Court noted, the
majority in the Slaughter-House Cases had explained that "one of the
privileges conferred by this Clause 'is that a citizen of the United
States can, of his own volition, become a citizen of any State of the
Union by a bona fide residence therein, with the same rights as other
citizens of that State.' "1' The Slaughter-House opinion listed other
privileges of the citizens of the United States-protection on the high
seas and in foreign lands, the right to use navigable waters, to travel
to Washington, D.C., and to visit sub-treasuries. 3 The Slaughter-
House majority also mentioned the right to assemble and petition the
government,'14 though the Court soon restricted its dicta to the right to
petition the national government." The Slaughter-House Cases'
10. Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489,511 (1999) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
11. ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION
OF THE LAW 166 (1990).
12. Saenz, 526 U.S. at 503 (quoting Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 80).
13. See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 79.
14. See id.
15. See United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 551-52 (1876) (limiting the right to
assemble and petition to national matters). In an illuminating article, Bryan H.
Wildenthal argues that the majority opinion in Slaughter-House did not clearly reject
incorporation and that the rejection occurred later, in 1875. See Bryan H. Wildenthal, The
Lost Compromise: A Reassessment of the 19th Century Debate on Incorporation of the
Bill of Rights in the Fourteenth Amendment (Feb. 21, 2000) (unpublished manuscript on
file with the North Carolina Law Review) (setting out a very fine account of the early
Supreme Court cases dealing with the question of application of the Bill of Rights to the
states). For a case interpreting the Privileges or Immunities Clause to protect the rights
set out in the Bill of Rights against state, federal, or private invasion, see United States v.
Hall, 26 F. Cas. 79, 81 (C.C.S.D. Ala. 1871) (No. 15,282), presenting a view consistent with
that of Justice Bradley at the time. See Letter from Justice Bradley to Judge Woods (Mar.
12, 1871), Bradley Papers, New Jersey Historical Society (on file with the North Carolina
Law Review).
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limited catalogue of privileges was an unlikely reading of the clause.
In contrast to suppressions of free speech, press, religion, and other
civil liberties in order to protect slavery from criticism in the years
1830 to 1860, state interference with use of navigable waters, visits to
the sub-treasuries, and the protection of citizens on the high seas and
in foreign lands were not matters of significant national controversy
in the years before the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified.1
6
The Court's recent resurrection of the Privileges or Immunities
Clause naturally has heightened interest in it. Will the "lost clause,"
whose life was cut short by the Supreme Court, have a new and
significant career in American constitutional law? If so, what will the
Court decide the clause means? And how will the Court decide? The
Slaughter-House dicta has been pretty much exhausted. We are
unlikely, anytime soon, to see a case in which a state has denied a
citizen the right to visit a sub-treasury or has interfered with the right
to protection on the high seas. If the "lost clause" is to have other
new and important meanings, the meanings will have to be found
outside most of the dicta in the Slaughter-House Cases.
In this Article, I review the last major battle over the Privileges
or Immunities Clause-the Black-Frankfurter debate over
application of the provisions of the Bill of Rights to the states. The
Black-Frankfurter debate includes a debate over interpretation that
will shape this article. Then, as Justice Frankfurter advocated, I
explore the original meaning of the words of the Privileges or
Immunities Clause to the ordinary reader at the time that the
Fourteenth Amendment was proposed and ratified. Application of
this method to the Privileges or Immunities Clause (a clause that
Frankfurter largely ignored) actually supports the positive result
advocated by Justices Black, Douglas, Murphy, and Rutledge-
application of the Bill of Rights guarantees to the states. Finally, I
reflect on the complex and difficult questions that lie only slightly
below the surface appeal of the idea of original meaning.
16. See Michael Kent Curtis, The 1837 Killing of Elijah Lovejoy by an Anti-Abolition
Mob: Free Speech, Mobs, Republican Government, and the Privileges of American
Citizens, 44 UCLA L. REv. 1109 passim (1997) [hereinafter Curtis, Lovejoy]; Michael
Kent Curtis, The 1859 Crisis over Hinton Helper's Book, The Impending Crisis: Free
Speech, Slavery, and Some Light on the Meaning of the First Section of the Fourteenth
Amendment, 68 CEH.-KENT L. REV. 1113 passim (1993) [hereinafter Curtis, Crisis over
Helper's Book]; Michael Kent Curtis, The Curious History of Attempts to Suppress
Antislavery Speech, Press, and Petition in 1835-37, 89 Nw. U. L. REv. 785 passim (1995)
[hereinafter Curtis, Curious History].
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I. ADAMSON v. CALIFORNIA, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT, THE
BILL OF RIGHTS, AND ORIGINAL MEANING
A. Original Meaning in Constitutional Analysis
Before Justice Frankfurter, original meaning had been
advocated by Justice Holmes,"8 and recently this approach has been
supported by Justices Scalia 19 and Thomas.20 Each of these Justices
advocates focusing on the historic meaning of the words used in the
constitutional text to determine their legal effect. The effort to
discover original meaning is worthwhile if one believes that original
meaning is at least one tool to be used in the search for constitutional
meaning. I think it is, but only one.21 Other factors that should be
considered include constitutional structure, precedent, broader
history, and ethical aspirations. In this Article, however, I focus on
history and original meaning. Courts should examine original
constitutional meaning by means of a rich and broad historical inquiry
that goes beyond focusing simply on the usage of words.21 Since all
17. See Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 63 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)
(stating that an ordinary reading of the Fourteenth Amendment leads to the conclusion
that it does not include the provisions of the first eight amendments (citing Eisner v.
Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 220 (1920) (Holmes, J., dissenting))), overruled in part by Malloy
v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
18. See Macomber, 252 U.S. at 220 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
19. See Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of
United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Law, in A MATTER OF
INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 3, 38 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997)
(explaining and defending originalism).
20. See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm., 514 U.S. 334, 359 (1995) (Thomas, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (advocating adherence to the original meaning of the Free
Speech and Press Clauses of the First Amendment).
21. Justice Holmes advocated considering what words would mean "'in the mouth of
a normal speaker of English, using them in the circumstances in which they were used.'"
William Winslow Crosskey, Charles Fairman, "Legislative History," and the Constitutional
Limitations of State Authority, 22 U. CH. L. REV. 1, 4 (1954) (quoting OLIVER WENDELL
HOLMES, COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 203,204 (1921)).
22. See, e.g., AXHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND
RECONSTRUCTION (1998); MICHAEL LES BENEDICT, A COMPROMISE OF PRINCIPLE:
CONGRESSIONAL REPUBLICANS AND RECONSTRUCTION: 1863-1869 (1974); JAMES E.
BOND, No EASY WALK TO FREEDOM: RECONSTRUCTION AND THE RATIFICATION OF
THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1997); MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, No STATE SHALL
ABRIDGE: THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS (1986)
[hereinafter CURTIS, No STATE SHALL ABRIDGE]; ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION:
AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION: 1863-1877 (1988); Richard L. Aynes, On
Misreading John Bingham and the Fourteenth Amendment, 103 YALE L.J. 57 (1993); ;
Michael Kent Curtis, Resurrecting the Privileges or Immunities Clause and Revising the
Slaughter-House Cases Without Exhuming Lochner: Individual Rights and the Fourteenth
Amendment, 38 B.C. L. REV. 1 (1996) [hereinafter Curtis, Resurrecting the Privileges or
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meaning is contextual, the larger historical context is crucial.
Difficult questions of method lurk below the superficial
simplicity of the idea of original meaning. The idea seems to assume
that words have a single, clear, universally accepted meaning.
Sometimes words in the Constitution have such meanings. For
example, the Constitution requires that each state shall have two
senators3 Other phrases, however, have a range of possible
meanings, and it is dubious that a single original understanding ever
existed. Such phrases include, for example, the power to regulate
commerce among the several states,24 the prohibition on denying
liberty without due process, and the command that no state shall deny
to any person equal protection of the laws0 Often, however, it may
be possible to identify what were probably more common and less
common original understandings and to say that some meanings are
within the range of reasonable probability and that some are not.
That is so in the case of the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
Applying Justice Frankfurter's method provides significant
insight into one core meaning of the Privileges or Immunities Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment. The effort also highlights the
difficulty of applying the method. Because the Black-Frankfurter
debate arose in the case of Adamson v. California,26 I now turn to that
case and the debate that it engendered.
B. The Black-Frankfurter Debate in Adamson v. California
The last time it seemed that the Privileges or Immunities Clause
might soon be revived was in Adamson v. California, thanks in part to
the efforts of Justice Hugo Black.27 In his now-famous dissenting
opinion, Justice Black convinced three other members of the Court
that Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment requires states to obey
all guarantees of the Bill of Rights, but the crucial fifth vote eluded
him. To support application of the Bill of Rights to the states, Justice
Black relied both on the text of the Due Process and Privileges or
Immunities Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment and on the
congressional legislative history of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Immunities Clause]; Curtis, Lovejoy, supra note 16, at 1147-50; Curtis, Crisis over Helper's
Book, supra note 16, at 1137-59; Curtis, Curious History, supra note 16, at 866-70.
23. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 1.
24. Seeid §8, cl.3.
25. See id. amend. XIV, § 1; id amend. V.
26. 332 U.S. 46 (1947), overruled in part by Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
27. See iL at 77, 85 (Black, J., dissenting).
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Admiral Dewey Adamson had been charged with murder in the
State of California. In earlier years, Adamson had been convicted of
burglary, larceny, and robbery. If he took the stand in his own
defense, the prosecutor could have cross-examined him about his
prior offenses." Although the jury would be told to consider
Adamson's prior crimes only as they related to his credibility as a
witness when he claimed to be innocent and not his guilt, most
lawyers think jurors have difficulty making the distinction.
On the other hand, if Adamson failed to take the stand, the judge
and prosecutor could tell the jury that his failure to refute the charges
against him could justify a negative inference against him on the issue
of guilt. Faced with this dilemma, Adamson elected not to testify.
The prosecutor and judge commented that his failure could be
considered by the jury in reaching its verdict.29 Adamson was
convicted and sentenced to death.
In federal court, such comments seemed to violate the Fifth
Amendment, which prohibits compelling any person to be a witness
against himself in a criminal case." The Supreme Court, however,
had held that the privilege against self-incrimination, together with a
number of other protections of the national Bill of Rights, did not
limit the states." Only those Bill of Rights guarantees implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty limited the states under the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The privilege against self-
incrimination was, as the Court saw it, not implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty;32 and the Court upheld Adamson's conviction. In
28. See id. at 68 (Black, J., dissenting); RICHARD C. CORTNER, THE SUPREME
COURT AND THE SECOND BILL OF RIGHTS: THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE
NATIONALIZATION OF CIVIL LIBERTIES 140-41 (1981). Adamson's holding that the
privilege against self-incrimination did not limit the states was rejected in Malloy v.
Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 2-3 (1964). States were required to provide criminal juries for serious
offenses in Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 157-62 (1968).
29. See Adamson, 332 U.S. at 48-49.
30. See id. at 61 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (discussing U.S. CONST. amend. V).
31. See, e.g., Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 99 (1908) (holding that the privilege
against self-incrimination does not limit the states under the Fourteenth Amendment),
overruled in part by Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964); Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S.
454,459-62 (1907) (expressing doubt about the incorporation of the guarantee of freedom
of the press under the Fourteenth Amendment); Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581, 604 (1900)
(holding that the right to a criminal jury trial does not limit the states under the
Fourteenth Amendment), abrogated by Williams v. Florida, 398 U.S. 78 (1970); Walker v.
Sauvinet, 92 U.S. 90, 92-93 (1876) (holding that the Seventh Amendment right to a civil
jury trial does not limit the states under the Fourteenth Amendment); see also CURTIS,
NO STATE SHALL ABRIDGE, supra note 22, at 171-211 (describing Supreme Court cases
on the application of the Bill of Rights to the states).
32. See Adamson, 332 U.S. at 53-54.
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addition to his due process claim, Adamson claimed that the
"privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States," which the
Fourteenth Amendment said no state could abridge, included Bill of
Rights protections such as the privilege against self incrimination.33
The Court also rejected Adamson's claim under the Privileges or
Immunities Clause.34
The Fourteenth Amendment provides that all persons born in
the United States and subject to its jurisdiction are citizens of the
United States. The Amendment also provides that "[n]o State shall
make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law."35 Based on text and precedent in 1868, one might have thought
citizens such as Mr. Adamson had a double protection against state
imposed self-incrimination. The Due Process Clause would have
protected Adamson as a person, and the Privileges or Immunities
Clause would have protected him as a citizen. But the Court had
rejected application on either theory.36
The Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination is a
process or criminal procedure guarantee. Prior to the framing of the
Fourteenth Amendment, the Court had suggested that to determine
at least part of the content of the Fifth Amendment's Due Process
Clause one could look to the procedures required by the
Constitution.37 From that decision one might have concluded that the
process required by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment would include, for example, those procedures for jury
trial and against compelled self-incrimination provided in the original
Bill of Rights.38 By this theory, the Fourteenth Amendment's Due
Process Clause would extend procedural protections of the Bill of
Rights to all "persons" within state jurisdiction.
33. See Appellant's Brief at 21, Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46,77,85 (1947) (No.
102), reprinted in 45 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF
THE UNITED STATES: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 535, 558 (Philip B. Kurland & Gerhard
Casper eds., 1975).
34. See Adamson, 332 U.S. at 51-53.
35. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
36. See Adamson, 332 U.S. at 50-54 (citing Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 328
(1937), overruled by Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969); Twining, 211 U.S. at 91-98).
37. See Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.)
272, 276-77 (1855); AMAR, supra note 22, at 173; CURTIS, No STATE SHALL ABRIDGE,
supra note 22, at 166; Crosskey, supra note 21, at 6-7.
38. See Murray's Lessee, 59 U.S. (18 How.) at 276-77; AMAR, supra note 22, at 173;
CURTIS, No STATE SHALL ABRIDGE, supra note 22, at 166; Crosskey, supra note 21, at 6-
7.
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Because Adamson was also a citizen, the plain meaning of the
text of the Privileges or Immunities Clause suggests that the privilege
against self-incrimination was one of those Bill of Rights privileges of
citizens of the United States that states could no longer abridge. A
modem dictionary, for example, defines a privilege as "a right,
immunity, or benefit enjoyed by a particular person or a restricted
group of persons" (one restricted group is citizens of the United
States); as "the principle or condition of enjoying special rights or
immunities;" and as "any of the rights common to all citizens under a
modem constitutional government.
39
The Supreme Court, of course, had seen things differently. In
1937, ten years before Adamson, in Palko v. Connecticut,40 the Court
gave a fairly elaborate explanation of why certain Bill of Rights
provisions did not limit the states.41 By the time Palko was decided,
some liberties in the Bill of Rights, such as free speech and free press,
had been held to limit the states.42 Other liberties, such as jury trial,
the privilege against self-incrimination, and the immunity from
double jeopardy, had not. 3 Justice Cardozo attempted to explain
why some, but not all, Bill of Rights liberties were protected from
state action under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. In doing so, he described all the rights in the Bill of
Rights collectively as privileges and immunities:
The exclusion of these immunities and privileges [jury trial,
the privilege against self-incrimination, etc.] from the
privileges and immunities [e.g., freedom of speech and press]
protected against the action of the states has not been
arbitrary or casual. It has been dictated by a study and
appreciation of the meaning, the essential implications, of
39. RANDOM HOUSE WEBSTER'S COLLEGE DIcIONARY 1036 (2d ed. 1997). These
are three of nine definitions.
40. 302 U.S. 319 (1937), overruled by Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969).
41. See id. at 323-26. Palko upheld another death sentence, this time against a double
jeopardy claim. See id. at 322.
42. See Near v. Minnesota, 284 U.S. 697, 707 (1931) (holding that liberty of the press
is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment); Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 368
(1931) (holding that the right of free speech is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment).
43. See, e.g., Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 99 (1908) (holding that the privilege
against self-incrimination does not limit the states under the Fourteenth Amendment),
overruled in part by Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964); Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581,
604 (1900) (holding that the right to a criminal jury trial does not limit the states under the
Fourteenth Amendment), abrogated by Williams v. Florida, 398 U.S. 78 (1970); Palko, 302
U.S. at 322 (holding that immunity from double jeopardy does not limit the states under
the Fourteenth Amendment); Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U.S. 90, 92-93 (1876) (holding that
Seventh Amendment right to civil jury trial does not limit the states under the Fourteenth
Amendment).
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liberty itself.
We reach a different plane of social and moral values
when we pass to the privileges and immunities that have
been taken over from the earlier articles of the federal bill of
rights and brought within the Fourteenth Amendment by a
process of absorption. These in their origin were effective
against the federal government alone. If the Fourteenth
Amendment has absorbed them, the process of absorption
has had its source in the belief that neither liberty nor justice
would exist if they were sacrificed. This is true, for
illustration, of freedom of thought and speech.
4
So, in 1947, when the Supreme Court held the privilege against
self-incrimination did not protect Adamson, it was following well-
established precedent. Justice Black sought to reverse a host of
earlier decisions and to apply all the guarantees of the Bill of Rights
to the states, but he faced a tenacious opponent in Justice Felix
Frankfurter. Justice Frankfurter wrote a concurring opinion in
Adamson aimed directly at Black's dissent.
Justices Black and Frankfurter differed on the application of the
Bill of Rights to the states in at least three major ways. Justice
Frankfurter had a rather low opinion of some of the guarantees of the
Bill of Rights and a higher regard for decisions holding that not all
those rights limit the states. He explained that "[s]ome of these
[guarantees of the Bill of Rights] are enduring reflections of
experience with human nature, while some express the restricted
views of Eighteenth-Century England regarding the best methods for
the ascertainment of facts." 45
Justice Black, on the other hand, had an almost religious
reverence for the Bill of Rights and a correspondingly lower opinion
of precedent refusing to apply the guarantees to the states. Justice
Black wrote:
I cannot consider the Bill of Rights to be an outworn 18th
Century "strait jacket" as the Twining opinion did. Its
provisions may be thought outdated abstractions by some.
And it is true that they were designed to meet ancient evils.
But they are the same kind of human evils that have
emerged from century to century wherever excessive power
is sought by the few at the expense of the many. In my
44. Palko, 302 U.S. at 325-26 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). Palko was
overruled in Benton, 395 U.S. at 794.
45. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 63 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., concurring),
overruled in part by Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
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judgment the people of no nation can lose their liberty so
long as a Bill of Rights like ours survives and its basic
purposes are conscientiously interpreted, enforced and
respected so as to afford continuous protection against old,
as well as new, devices and practices which might thwart
those purposes.46
Justices Black and Frankfurter also disagreed about the
Fourteenth Amendment's history. Justice Black thought, correctly in
my view, that the history of the adoption of the Fourteenth
Amendment supported application of the guarantees of the Bill of
Rights to the states.4 7 He pointed to remarks by Representative John
Bingham, the primary author of Section 1 of the Fourteenth
Amendment, and Senator Jacob Howard, who presented the
Amendment to the Senate on behalf of the committee that wrote it.45
Both Bingham and Howard had explained that the Privileges or
Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment required states to
obey the guarantees of the Bill of Rights.49 Justice Frankfurter, on
the other hand, thought contemporary judicial opinions were a better
historical guide. Frankfurter wrote that the idea that the Fourteenth
Amendment imposes the dictates of the Bill of Rights on the states
"was rejected by judges who were themselves witnesses of the process
by which the Fourteenth Amendment became part of the
Constitution.
' 50
Justices Black and Frankfurter also differed about method.
Frankfurter said that remarks of particular senators and
representatives were not conclusive evidence of the Amendment's
meaning. What counted instead were the words of the proposal, not
the words in congressional speeches about it. "After all," Frankfurter
explained "an amendment to the Constitution should be read in a
46. Id at 89 (Black, J., dissenting).
47. For support for the Black view, see, for example, HENRY ABRAHAM, FREEDOM
AND THE COURT 45-46 (1977) (providing substantial, but not unqualified, support for
Justice Black); CURnTS, No STATE SHALL ABRIDGE, supra note 22, passim; Alfred Avins,
Incorporation of the Bill of Rights: The Crosskey-Fairman Debates Revisited, 6 HARV. J.
ON LEGIS. 1, 25-26 (1968); Aynes, supra note 22, at 63-66; Crosskey, supra note 21, at 2-
119; see also AMAR, supra note 22, at 215-94 (providing substantial, but not unqualified,
support for Justice Black).
48. See Adamson, 332 U.S. at 68, app. at 93, 98, 100-102, 106-07 (Black, J.,
dissenting).
49. See CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app. 84 (1871) (statement of Rep.
Bingham); CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2765 (1866) (statement of Sen. Howard);
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2542 (1866) (statement of Rep. Bingham); CONG.
GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1294 (1866) (statement of Rep. Bingham).
50. Adamson, 332 U.S. at 63-64 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
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' "sense most obvious to the common understanding at the time of its
adoption."... For it was for public adoption that it was proposed.' "51
C. Applying Justice Frankfurter's Method to the Privileges or
Immunities Clause
Frankfurter insisted that the language of the Due Process Clause
would hardly have been commonly understood by the general public
as including "all the rights" in the Bill of Rights. According to
Frankfurter, the language of the Due Process Clause would be an
"extraordinarily strange" way of saying that "every State must
thereafter initiate prosecutions through indictment by a grand jury,
must have a trial by a jury of twelve in criminal cases, and must have
trial by such a jury in common law suits where the amount in
controversy exceeds twenty dollars."52
In arguing that it was bizarre to find the procedural guarantees of
the Bill of Rights encompassed in the Due Process Clause, Justice
Frankfurter was mistaken. After all, the privilege against self-
incrimination was a process guarantee; prior precedent had suggested
that the procedures required by the Constitution were at least part of
what the Due Process Clause required,53 and state courts had
sometimes interpreted due process or the analogous law-of-the-land
clauses of their states' constitutions to require procedures, such as
grand jury indictment, that were also enshrined in the Bill of Rights.5 4
In addition, Sir Edward Coke's great book on the Magna Carta had
considered its law-of-the-land clause,55 the predecessor of our Due
Process Clause, to require a grand jury indictment. William Penn,
John Adams, and Massachusetts' Chief Justice Lemuel Shaw took the
same position.5 6 In addition, William Blackstone said that the law-of-
51. Id. at 63 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (quoting Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189,
220 (1920) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (quoting Bishop v. State, 48 N.E. 1038, 1040 (Ind.
1898))).
52. Id. (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
53. See Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.)
272, 276-77 (1855); AMAR, supra note 22, at 173; CURTIS, No STATE SHALL ABRIDGE,
supra note 22, at 166; Crosskey, supra note 21, at 6-7.
54. See, e.g., Jones v. Robbins, 74 Mass. (8 Gray) 329,344 (1857).
55. Chapter 39 of the Magna Carta provides: "No freeman shall be captured or
imprisoned or disseised or outlawed or exiled or in any way destroyed ... except by the
lawful judgment of his peers or by the law of the land." MAGNA CARTA ch. 39 (1215),
reprinted in 1 THE BILL OF RIGHTS, A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 8, 12 (Bernard
Schwartz ed., 1971) [hereinafter DOCUMENTARY HISTORY]. The law-of-the-land clause
was interpreted to require due process before deprivation of life or liberty.
56. For a discussion of Sir Edward Coke, John Adams, Chief Justice Shaw, and
William Penn on the law-of-the-land clause and the right to a grand jury, see CURTIS, No
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the-land clause required a criminal jury trial.57 As Akhil Amar has
noted, James Kent, the great commentator on American law;
Supreme Court Justice Joseph Story in his Commentaries on the
Constitution; and abolitionist Alvin Stewart also insisted that due
process or the law of the land-the two were regarded as
equivalent-required grand juries.5  On the other hand, as
Frankfurter noted, a number of states did not specifically require
grand-jury indictment at the time the Fourteenth Amendment was
adopted, and some states held that it was not required under their
state constitutions. 9
Although Justice Frankfurter may have been mistaken about the
lack of historic support for finding the procedural guarantees of the
Bill of Rights in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, his larger point about method was an important one. In
a government based on popular sovereignty, the general
understanding of the people at the time of ratification of a
constitutional provision is a more important factor in determining
constitutional meaning than the views of the provision's framers.
Because the Constitution is legitimated by its enactment by "We the
People" through our representatives, the understanding of the people
is what counts. Those who ratify constitutional amendments, by this
theory, are analogous to agents or representatives of the sovereign
people. Ratification based on recondite meanings not understood by
people at large, as Frankfurter suggested, would be illegitimate.
Of course, remarks of Senators and Representatives are some
evidence not only of original intent of the legislators who proposed an
amendment, but also of popular original understanding of the
meaning of the words. (Intent and popular understanding might or
might not coincide.) In the case of the Fourteenth Amendment, for
instance, many would read and be influenced by remarks of leading
framers such as John Bingham and Jacob Howard, as reported in the
press and in the Congressional Globe.' In addition, Bingham and
STATE SHALL ABRIDGE, supra note 22, at 181.
57. For Blackstone on the criminal trial jury as required by the law-of-the-land clause
of the Magna Carta, see 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF
ENGLAND *379.
58. See AMAR, supra note 22, at 201.
59. See Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 64 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., concurring),
overruled in part by Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964); see also Felix Frankfurter,
Memorandum on "Incorporation" of the Bill of Rights into the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, 78 HARV. L. REV. 746, 768-83 (1965) (providing examples of
state constitutional provisions).
60. See, e.g., Crosskey, supra note 21, at 102-03 (reporting that the New York Times
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Howard's understanding of the words "privileges or immunities" is
some evidence of how the words were generally used.
Justice Frankfurter's textual argument about the Due Process
Clause dealt with only one of the two clauses that had been invoked
to justify application of the Bill of Rights (and specifically the
privilege against self-incrimination) to the states. How did he deal
with the Privileges or Immunities Clause? Significantly, he did not
claim that the phrase "privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States" would be a very odd way to describe the guarantees of
the Federal Bill of Rights. Instead, Justice Frankfurter said he was
"concerned solely with a discussion of the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment ... put[ting] to one side the Privileges or
Immunities Clause of that Amendment" because of the "mischievous
uses to which that clause would lend itself."'" Here again, Frankfurter
had a legitimate concern. Courts had struck down minimum wage,
62
maximum hour,63 and worker protection' laws under a doctrine of
liberty of contract they found in the Due Process Clause. Frankfurter
feared the Privileges or Immunities Clause could provide a vehicle for
doing the same thing.' Of course, many constitutional provisions,
and the New York Herald reprinted Howard's speech saying that the Privileges or
Immunities Clause would require states to obey the Bill of Rights); Amending the
Constitution-Federal Power and State Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 1866, at 2 (reporting
Representative Bingham's statement that the an early version of the Privileges or
Immunities Clause would require states to obey guarantees of the federal Bill of Rights);
Senator Howard's Speech, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, May 24, 1866, at 8 (recounting
Howard's speech); Thirty-Ninth Congress, The Reconstruction Resolutions, N.Y. TIMES,
May 24, 1866, at 1 (recounting Senator Howard's statement, "I believe to these privileges
and immunities may be added the personal right [sic] guaranteed by the first eight
amendments"); Thirty-Ninth Congress, The Constitutional Amendment, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
1, 1866, at 5 (reporting similar views by Representative Bingham); see also CONG. GLOBE,
39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2765-66 (1866) (statement of Sen. Howard) (discussing the
Fourteenth Amendment's Privileges or Immunities Clause); CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong.,
1st Sess. 2542 (1866) (statement of Rep. Bingham) (commenting on the Fourteenth
Amendment); CuRTIs, NO STATE SHALL ABRIDGE, supra note 22, at 128 (citing news
accounts); STEPHEN P. HALBROOK, FREEDMEN, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDENT, AND
THE RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS, 1866-1876, at 36 (1998) (quoting the New York Times, New
York Herald, and the National Intelligencer of May 24, 1866, which reported Howard's
statement about the Privileges or Immunities Clause and the Bill of Rights).
61. Adamson, 332 U.S. at 61 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
62. See Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525, 562 (1923), overruled in part by
West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
63. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 64 (1905), reversed by West Coast Hotel
Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
64. See Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 26 (1915), overruled in part by Phelps Dodge
Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177 (1941).
65. Indeed, Frankfurter's fears may be realized. Today some seek to revive economic
substantive due process under the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth
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including the First Amendment, have the potential for mischief if
misapplied. That fact hardly justifies draining them of all significant
meaning.
Justice Black shared Justice Frankfurter's concern. His solution
was to limit the rights protected by the first section of the Fourteenth
Amendment to those set out in the text of the Constitution, such as
the guarantees of the Bill of Rights. Increasingly rigid application of
this method eventually led Justice Black to reject the claim that the
requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt could be found in
the Due Process Clause.66
Though Justice Frankfurter had suggested interpreting
constitutional language in accordance with the common
understanding at the time of the Amendment's ratification, in fact he
made no real effort to explore the common understanding of the
words "privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States" in
the years 1866-1868. He did, however, remark that "[a]rguments that
may now be adduced to prove that the first eight Amendments were
concealed within the historic phrasing of the Fourteenth Amendment
were not unknown at the time of its adoption." 67 He claimed that a
"surer estimate of their bearing was possible for judges at the time
than distorting distance is likely to vouchsafe."' '  The understanding
of Justices (at first a bare majority of the Court) seven years after the
Fourteenth Amendment was proposed and five years after
ratification was complete 69 is hardly conclusive proof of common
understanding at the time the amendment was proposed and ratified.
Judges have a specialized understanding that may be quite
Amendment. See, e.g., PAUL KENS, LOCHNER V. NEW YORK, ECONOMIC REGULATION
ON TRIAL 182-86 (1998) (describing calls for a return to a Lochner approach); Kimberly
C. Shankman & Roger Pilon, Reviving the Privileges or Immunities Clause to Redress the
Balance Among States, Individuals, and the Federal Government, 3 TEx. REv. L. & POL. 1,
41-44 (1999) (suggesting the Privileges or Immunities Clause should be used against
modem economic regulation). The Congressional history contains some statements that
support both an expansive and a more limited reading of privileges or immunities. See,
e.g., 2 CONG. REC. 384-85 (1874) (statement of Rep. Mills); CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 2d
Sess. 843-44 (1872) (statement of Sen. Sherman); CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 334
(1871) (statement of Rep. Hoar); CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app. 84 (1871)
(statement of Rep. Bingham); CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2765-66 (1866)
(statement of Sen. Howard); CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2542 (1866) (statement
of Rep. Bingham); see also Crosskey, supra note 21, at 92 (delineating different
interpretations of "privileges" and "immunities" by legislators).
66. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358,377 (1970) (Black, J., dissenting).
67. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 64 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., concurring),
overruled in part by Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
68. Id (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
69. See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36passim (1873).
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uncommon. Furthermore, they are guided in their interpretations by
far more than the common understanding of the words of the
Constitution at the time of adoption. At the time the Justices that
Frankfurter cited wrote, the nation and the Court were beginning
their long retreat from Reconstruction, and the Fourteenth
Amendment, of course, was a centerpiece of Reconstruction.70 In
short, a judicial decision in 1873 or 1876 does not necessarily
represent popular understanding of the meaning of words in 1866-
1868.
In 1969, Justice Black returned to the issue raised by
Frankfurter's textual criticism. Justice John Marshall Harlan had
dissented from a decision requiring states to furnish jury trial for all
persons accused of offenses punishable by imprisonment of more
than six months.7' In the course of his dissent, Justice Harlan said
that "the great words of the four clauses of the first section of the
Fourteenth Amendment would have been an exceedingly peculiar
way to say that 'The rights heretofore guaranteed against federal
intrusion by the first eight Amendments are henceforth guaranteed
against state intrusion as well.' "72 Justice Black responded:
I can say only that the words "No State shall make or
enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States" seem to me an
eminently reasonable way of expressing the idea that
henceforth the Bill of Rights shall apply to the States. What
more precious "privilege" of American citizenship could
there be than that privilege to claim the protections of our
great Bill of Rights? I suggest that any reading of
"privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States"
which excludes the Bill of Rights' safeguards renders the
words of this section of the Fourteenth Amendment
meaningless. 73
Justice Black reiterated that he relied on both the Due Process and
Privileges or Immunities Clauses to accomplish application of the Bill
70. See generally, e.g., CURTIS, No STATE SHALL ABRIDGE, supra note 22, at 57-91
(discussing the congressional history of the Fourteenth Amendment); WILLIAM E.
NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT: FROM POLITICAL PRINCIPLE TO JUDICIAL
DOCrRINE 40-63 (1988) (considering the effects of Reconstruction on the drafting of the
amendment).
71. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149-50 (1968); id at 172 (Harlan, J.,
dissenting).
72. Id at 174 n.9 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (citing Charles Fairman, Does the Fourteenth
Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights? The Original Understanding, 2 STAN. L. REV.
5 (1949)).
73. Id at 166 (Black, J., concurring).
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of Rights to the states.74
Like Frankfurter, some who appeal to common understanding or
original meaning make no serious effort to explore the common
historic understanding of the words "privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States." The failure is perfectly understandable.
The task is immense, and the methods to be used are not clear. It
requires trying to understand how an entire political community in
1866-1868 commonly understood these words That fact may be
one reason scholars have often pursued intent rather than original
meaning and have looked at much smaller groups of people in an
effort to determine their intent.76 One could look, for example, at the
congressmen who framed the Fourteenth Amendment and at the
state legislators who ratified it. Most congressmen and state
legislators, however, did not address the subject. As a result, some
scholars look for still smaller groups-such as "leading proponents. '77
Even such people, however, rarely share an explicit, unequivocally
expressed, unanimous understanding. That is at least equally true, of
course, for original meaning, which involves a far greater number of
people.
Although its appeal as a matter of theory is substantial, as a
practical matter, original meaning is really quite difficult to
determine.78 Extensive research may show some usages to be so rare
or nonexistent that one can rule them out and others to be so
common, pervasive, and unambiguous that the case is clear. But for
most, if not all, controversial questions, there will be ambiguities and
cross currents raising the difficult question of how much proof is
enough. Probability is the very best we can hope for.
74. Id. at 166 n.1 (Black, I., concurring).
75. Justice Thomas is a notable exception to the failure to undertake historical
excavation. Indeed, he has also advocated reevaluating the historic meaning of the clause.
See Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489,522-23 (1999) (Thomas, J., dissenting). As Justice Thomas
explained in his Saenz dissent, "[b]ecause I believe that the demise of the Privileges or
Immunities Clause has contributed in no small part to the current disarray of our
Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence, I would be open to reevaluating its meaning in an
appropriate case." Id at 527-28 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
76. See, e.g., RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE
TRANSFORMAnON OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 190 (2d ed. 1997).
77. Id.
78. For proponents of original meaning, see, for example, supra notes 17-20 and
accompanying text. Professor William Winslow Crosskey was an early proponent of
original meaning. See Crosskey, supra note 21, at 2-10.
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II. AN OVERVIEW
This Article79 will show that in the thirty-five years or so before
the 1868 ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, common usage
often referred to Bill of Rights liberties as "privileges," "immunities,"
or "rights" of Americans or of citizens of the United States. The
Article will show that the usage was widespread and that it had deep
historic roots. Few, if any, people in the years 1830-68 explicitly
denied that the phrase "privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States" included rights listed in the Bill of Rights, and a
number supported the proposition. The evidence suggests that most
participants in the political community probably would have assented
to the following claim as a reasonable meaning of the words
"privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States": "The
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States include the
privileges or immunities or rights set out in the Bill of Rights."
Perhaps most of these participants even would have suggested that
meaning if asked. But most of them, even most of the elite, were
silent. As to the rest, the words of most of those who may have
shared a common understanding of the clause have been lost. A poll
of public opinion would have been quite helpful, but none was taken.
It is far easier to say that one reconstruction of a past usage is a
reasonable one than to say it is the most reasonable. Similar
difficulties, of course, face any other proposed original meaning.
The research reported here shows that many Americans in the
79. This Article reports on recent discoveries in my ongoing search for "common
understanding" of the words "privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States."
Many of the examples I cite were discovered in research on free speech history. This
Article draws on my current research, on my own prior work on the meaning of privileges
or immunities in the Fourteenth Amendment, on important recent work by such scholars
as Akhil Reed Amar and Richard Aynes, and on the work of scholars who have explored
these questions before, especially Professors William Winslow Crosskey and Michael
Conant. See AMAR, supra note 22, passim (providing a particularly rich, eloquent, and
important source); CURTIS, No STATE SHALL ABRIDGE, supra note 22, passim; Aynes,
supra note 22, passim (particularly important for its examination of treatise writers around
the time of the Fourteenth Amendment); Michael Conant, Antimonopoly Tradition Under
the Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments: Slaughter-House Cases Re-Examined, 31 EMORY
LJ. 785 passim (1982) (an early and important influence on my thinking about what
Conant called "historical linguistics" and the source of several examples used in CURTIS,
No STATE SHALL ABRIDGE, supra note 22, and later in this Article); Crosskey, supra note
21, passim (the most important influence on my work); Curtis, Lovejoy, supra note 16, at
1147-50; Arnold T. Guminski, The Rights, Privileges, and Immunities of the American
People: A Disjunctive Theory of Selective Incorporation of the Bill of Rights, 7 WHITrIER
L. REV. 765, 790-97 (1985) (describing the use of privileges or immunities in treatises). In
the interest of space, I will not discuss academic controversies or opposing views
surrounding this subject.
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eighteenth and nineteenth centuries described certain fundamental
rights and liberties set out in the Bill of Rights specifically as
privileges or immunities of citizens." As time went on, references
began to evolve. Particularly by the late 1830s, more and more
people were likely to assert explicitly that the privileges belonged to
all Americans and were established or secured in the Federal
Constitution. Such usage was common in the years before the 1866
framing of the Fourteenth Amendment. 81
These findings are inclusive rather than exclusive. Other claims
need to be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. For a right to qualify,
based on original meaning, as a likely privilege or immunity of
citizens of the United States, it should meet at least two criteria.
First, the claimed right or liberty must have been described with some
regularity as a privilege or immunity or must be quite similar to ones
that were. Second, the privilege or immunity should have been
understood as one specifically, though not uniquely, belonging to
citizens of the United States, as opposed, for example, to a right
existing merely under state law. These criteria are based on a natural
reading of the text as well as on historical exploration.
I have come to the following conclusions: (1) The words
"privileges and immunities" often were used to describe fundamental
rights and liberties such as those in the Federal Bill of Rights. (2)
When they were used to describe fundamental constitutional rights,
the words "privileges" and "immunities" often were used as
synonyms for the words "rights" and "liberties." (3) This usage
stretches from the English and Colonial period, in which such rights
were considered privileges of freeborn Englishmen, through the
struggle for American independence, to the American Civil War and
the framing of the Fourteenth Amendment and beyond. (4) By the
late 1830s, such privileges and immunities were more and more often
spoken of as basic rights and liberties of all Americans, secured or
established by the federal as well as state constitutions. They were
not understood simply as the rights of citizens of particular states.
This usage became more frequent and explicit as the nation matured.
(5) The more one looks, the more examples one finds. Of course,
some examples are clearer than others. Some are ambiguous. (6)
The "Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States" 82
referred to in Article IV were sometimes thought of as certain rights
80. See discussion infra Part IV.
81. See id
82. U.S. CONST. art IV, § 2, ci. 1.
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arising under state law that temporary visitors from other states were
entitled to share and were sometimes thought of as including national
constitutional privileges such as those in the Bill of Rights.83 This
Article will focus on conclusions one through five. The examples that
follow involve uses of the words "privileges" and "immunities" as
equivalent to fundamental rights set out in Bills of Rights.
There are three parts to the argument that follows: First, the
words "privilege" and "immunity" often were used historically as
synonyms for "right" or "liberty."'  Second, people commonly
described the rights in the Bill of Rights as "rights," "privileges," or
"immunities." Finally, these privileges, immunities, or rights often
were described as rights of Americans, American citizens, or citizens
of the United States.
Because the word "rights" was used commonly as a synonym for
"privileges" or "immunities," many would have understood a
statement that rights in the Bill of Rights are "rights of citizens of the
United States" as equivalent to saying that they are "privileges of
citizens of the United States." For example, a statement that free
speech is a fundamental constitutional right of citizens of the United
States is therefore relevant to whether free speech would be
understood as a privilege of citizens of the United States. That is so
because "right" and "privilege" were often used interchangeably. Of
course, the meaning of the Privileges or Immunities Clause remains
intensely controversial. Opposing perspectives are discussed in the
sources set out in the notes.'
Although the crucial original understanding of the words
"privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States" is the
understanding of citizens in 1866-1868 (the time of the proposal and
83. See CURTIs, No STATE SHALL ABRIDGE, supra note 22, at 37-38,42-44, 60-61.
84. Many people from 1835 to 1860 emphasized the right and the lack of any federal
or state power over freedom of speech. Discussions did not clearly distinguish between
rights and power.
85. See BERGER, supra note 76, at 30-56, 155-89; BOND, supra note 22, passim
(discussing the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment by the Southern states); DAVID
CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE FIRST HUNDRED YEARS
342-52 (1985) (arguing mainly that Section 1 merely prohibited discrimination under state
law); NELSON, supra note 70, at 118 (same). But see NELSON, supra note 70, at 123 ("Only
one historical conclusion can therefore be drawn: namely, that Congress and the state
legislatures never specified whether section one was intended to be simply an equality
provision or a provision protecting absolute rights as well."). For another analysis, see
John Harrison, Reconstructing the Privileges or Immunities Clause, 101 YALE L.J. 1385,
1410-33 (1992) (interpreting the Privileges or Immunities Clause of Section 1 of the
Fourteenth Amendment as originally intended to limit discrimination under state law and
remaining agnostic on incorporation).
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ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment), we should also look at
earlier usage for at least three reasons. First, many of the earlier
sources were classics in law or the history of liberty and were likely to
be known to people in 1866-1868. Others involved controversial
events of national significance. The Writs of Assistance Cases,6 the
trial of William Penn,87 and the Revolutionary Declarations 8M would
probably have been familiar to many Americans. Blackstone's
Commentaries were read and relied on by people in 1866 as a
preeminent, but not infallible, legal authority.89 Revolutionary
declarations about the privileges of Englishmen were cited by James
Kent's Commentaries and other sources familiar to people in 1866-
1868.90 The Sedition Act debates were available in the Annals of
Congress and in newspapers of the day.91 As we move to public
discussion in the 1830s, 1840s, and 1850s, many citizens in 1866-1868
would themselves have read discussions of crucial events such as the
killing of abolitionist editor Elijah Lovejoy in 1837, just twenty-nine
years before the Fourteenth Amendment was framed.92 Discussion
on the eve of the Civil War would be more immediately familiar and
during the Civil War more immediate still. The similarity of rhetoric
used in 1866 with that used in earlier times also suggests familiarity
with historic sources.
Second, continuous usage of the word "privilege" (or
"immunity") as equivalent to the word "right" is some evidence that
later usage would be widely understood as having the same meaning.
The third point is related. If people at an earlier time referred to
liberties such as freedom of the press as a privilege or a privilege of
American citizens, their children would be more likely to adopt the
86. For an 1868 discussion of the Writs of Assistance Cases, citing earlier sources, see
THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH
REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION *301-
04.
87. Penn's trial had long been a classic source for Quakers. It gave rise to Bushell's
case, a leading precedent on the freedom of the criminal jury from coercion by the bench.
For citations to these cases, see id at *321 n.1.
88. For a citation to the 1774 Declaration of Rights by the Continental Congress, see,
for example, CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1833 (1866) (statement of Rep.
Lawrence).
89. See THE RECONSTRUCION AMENDMENTS' DEBATES 162, 164, 197, 205 (Alfred
Avins ed., 1967).
90. 2 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 1-32 (Da Capo Press 1971)
(1827). For a number of references to Kent's Commentaries, see THE RECONSTRUCrION
AMENDMENTS' DEBATES, supra note 89, at 755.
91. See JAMES MORTON SMITH, FREEDOM'S FETTERS: THE ALIEN AND SEDITION
LAWS AND AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES 35-93,101-04 (1956).
92. See Curtis, Lovejoy, supra note 16, at 1160-62.
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usage, and such adoption of the language would also be likely in the
next generation. The fact that we will see such usage much earlier
and before, during, and after the Civil War tends to confirm that
point. Later usage can be relevant for similar reasons.
Of course, words are used in different contexts in different ways.
The word "privilege" was used historically at least as expansively as
people use the word "right" today. There are, for example, common-
law evidentiary privileges, privilege licenses under municipal law, and
privileges under state law. The words "privileges" and "immunities"
can be used to describe a broader and less well-defined group of legal
interests than fundamental constitutional rights of citizens of the
United States. For example, a Minnesota court said in 1862 that "a
mortgage given to secure a negotiable promissory note partakes of
the privileges and immunities of commercial paper."93
Of course, usage in 1866 may not be in accord with some modem
theories. In 1913, Professor Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld published an
influential article suggesting that important theoretical and legal
distinctions should be made between rights, privileges, and
immunities.94  Hohfeld's work had a substantial impact on many
trained in the law, though his call to use the words in distinct ways has
never fully triumphed. Still, Hohfeld wrote as a legal theorist, not as
a linguist or historian. It would be anachronistic to assume that
people in the nineteenth century used the words "rights,"
"privileges," and "immunities" exactly as Hohfeld later suggested
they should.
The pages that follow will look at usage of "privilege" and
"immunities" throughout American history. The discussion will show
that by 1866, when Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment was
proposed, many people described basic rights in the Bill of Rights as
"privileges" or "immunities" belonging to citizens of the United
States or to American citizens."
93. Johnson v. Carpenter, 7 Minn. 176,182 (1862).
94. See Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied
in Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16, 30-44 (1913) (explaining the distinction between
rights and privileges).
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III. PRIVILEGES, IMMUNITIES, AND FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS IN
AMERICAN HISTORY FROM ENGLISH ORIGINS TO THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION
A. English and Colonial Background
By the time of the American Revolution, most basic liberties
later set out in the Bill of Rights had been asserted by Parliament as
liberties of Englishmen, though (by the orthodox view in England)
the guarantees limited only the King, not Parliament.9 5 These rights
had been asserted in a series of documents ranging from the Magna
Carta96 to the Petition of Right9 and the English Bill of Rights.9
American colonial laws quite early claimed that the colonists were
entitled to all the "rights liberties immunities priviledges and free
customs" enjoyed by "any naturall born subject of England," as
articulated in the Maryland Act for the Liberties of the People in
1639. 99 The 1677 Concessions and Agreements of West New Jersey
provided that "the common law or fundamental rights and privileges
of West New Jersey" were not to be altered by the legislature.' 0
These rights and privileges included due process, jury trial, freedom
of religious opinion, and public trials.101
Colonial Americans, of course, might have understood the words
"rights" and "liberties" to be distinct from the words "privileges" and
"immunities." However, colonial and revolutionary era American
attorneys, politicians, journalists, and scholars seem not to have
distinguished "privileges" and "immunities" from "rights" and
'"liberties." For example, Massachusetts attorney and colonial leader
James Otis argued in a 1761 case that writs of assistance were illegal.
The writs were general search warrants that did not specify the place
to be searched or the thing to be seized. In his argument to the court,
Otis said:
Now one of the most essential branches of English liberty is
95. See, e.g., 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 768-69 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789) (statement of
James Madison in the First Congress under the Constitution).
96. See MAGNA CARTA ch. 39, supra note 55, at 12.
97. See Petition of Right (1628), reprinted in 1 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note
55, at 19, 19-21.
98. See Bill of Rights (1689), reprinted in 1 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 55,
at 41, 41-46.
99. Maryland Act for the Liberties of the People (1639), reprinted in 1
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 55, at 68, 68.
100. See Concessions and Agreements of West New Jersey (1677), reprinted in 1
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 55, at 126, 126.
101. See id.
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the freedom of one's house. A man's house is his castle; and
while he is quiet, he is as well guarded as a prince in his
castle. This writ, if it should be declared legal, would totally
annihilate this privilege.102
The words "rights" and "privileges" were used interchangeably
not only in American courtrooms, but also in the colonial press and
pamphlets. 0 3 Cato's Letters were influential essays on liberty that
were widely republished in colonial America and were "'quoted in
every colonial newspaper from Boston to Savannah.' "04 Cato used
the words "right" and "privilege" synonymously when discussing a
fundamental liberty such as free speech:
Without Freedom of Thought, there can be no such Thing as
Wisdom, and no such Thing as public Liberty, without
Freedom of Speech, which is the Right of every Man, as far
as by it he does not hurt or controul the Right of another:
And this is the only Check it ought to suffer, and the only
Bounds it ought to know.
This sacred Priviledge is so essential to free Governments,
that the Security of Property, and the Freedom of Speech
always go together .... 10
Similarly, William Penn, a Quaker and the founder of
Pennsylvania, asserted that a right to a jury trial was one of the
fundamental privileges of British subjects. 6 In 1670, after Quakers
had been forbidden to meet in their meeting houses, Penn was tried
for speaking to a religious meeting held in the street. When the jury
entered a verdict of not guilty, the jury was threatened by the
judges.' 7 Penn saw this threat as a violation of the basic right to a
jury trial. He admonished the jury: "'You are Englishmen; mind
your privilege, give not away your right.' "108 Later, in 1687, when
Penn wrote a treatise on English liberties for Americans, he entitled it
102. John Adams, Abstract of the Argument, in 2 LEGAL PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS
134, 142 (L. Kinvin Wroth & Hiller B. Zobel eds., 1965) (emphasis added) (recounting
Otis's argument).
103. See LEONARD W. LEVY, THE EMERGENCE OF A FREE PRESS 109-14 (1985).
104. Id. at 113 (quoting ELIZABETH CHRISTINE COOK, LITERARY INFLUENCES IN
COLONIAL NEWSPAPERS: 1704-1750, at 81 (1912)).
105. Zenger's Journal Presents "Cato," in FREEDOM OF THE PRESS FROM ZENGER TO
JEFFERSON 10, 11-12 (Leonard W. Levy ed., Carolina Academic Press 1996) (1966)
[hereinafter FREEDOM OF THE PRESS] (emphasis added).
106. See CURTIS, No STATE SHALL ABRIDGE, supra note 22, at 64.
107. See The People's Ancient and Just Liberties Asserted, in the Trial of William Penn
and William Mead, in 1 SELECT WORKS OF WILLIAM PENN 179-96 (4th ed. 1825),
reprinted in 1 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 55, at 144,144-58.
108. I& at 192, reprinted in 1 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 55, at 154.
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The Excellent Priviledge of Liberty & Property Being the Birth-Right
of Free-Born Subjects of England.'"
Benjamin Franklin similarly used the terms "privileges" and
"rights" as equivalent. Writing as "Silence Dogood," Franklin said,
"I am naturally very jealous for the Rights and Liberties of my
Country; & the least appearance of an Incroachment on those
invaluable Priviledges, is apt to make my Blood boil exceedingly.' 10
The use of the terms "rights" and "privileges" in legal literature
mirrors that of the colonial press. William Blackstone's
Commentaries on the Laws of England were widely read and cited in
America."' As one of the few summaries of the English law, the
Commentaries were read by lawyers and laymen alike. Blackstone
wrote that the rights and liberties of "every Englishman" had been set
out in the Magna Carta, the Petition of Right, the Habeas Corpus
Act, The English Bill of Rights, and the Act of Settlement. These
documents contain many rights similar to those in the American Bill
of Rights. Blackstone described these rights collectively as the
"'privileges' " or " 'immunities' " of British subjects.' For
Blackstone, privileges or immunities seemed to refer to positive rights
or liberties secured by society." 4 In another place he describes the
right to trial by jury as a privilege, "the most transcendent privilege
which any subject can enjoy."" 5
B. Use of the Words "Privileges" and "Immunities" During the
American Revolution
At the time of the Revolution, Americans again seem to have
used the words interchangeably. As the American Revolution
approached, colonists adopted many protest resolutions. In 1774, a
resolution from Georgia insisted that Americans were entitled to
"'the same rights, privileges, and immunities with their fellow
subjects in Great Britain.' "116 A meeting that same year in Virginia
109. Excerpts of Penn's treatise are printed in A.E. DICK HOWARD, THE ROAD FROM
RUNNYMEDE: MAGNA CARTA AND CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AMERICA app. D at 412-
25 (1968).
110. Silence Dogood, No. 2, NEW-ENGLAND COURANT, Apr. 16, 1722, reprinted in
BENJAMIN FRANKLIN, WRITINGS 7,8 (J.A. Leo Lemay ed., 1987).
111. See HOWARD, supra note 109, at 268.
112. See CURTIS, NO STATE SHALL ABRIDGE, supra note 22, at 75-76 (quoting
Blackstone's Commentaries, 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 57, at *123).
113. Id. at 76.
114. See icl
115. 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 57, at *379.
116. CURTIS, NO STATE SHALL ABRIDGE, supra note 22, at 65 (quoting HOWARD,
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chaired by George Washington claimed "'all the privileges,
immunities, and advantages of the people of Great Britain.' ""v The
"resolves of the First Continental Congress also claimed 'all the
rights, liberties, and immunities of free' English subjects."" 8 One of
these was" 'the great and inestimable privilege of being tried by their
peers of the vicinage'" according to the due course of law."9 The
Continental Congress's Declaration to Take up Arms complained of
Parliament's unwarranted extension of the jurisdiction of Admiralty
and Vice Admiralty Courts and of "depriving us of the accustomed
and inestimable privilege of trial by jury, in cases affecting both life
and property."'" °
The colonists saw these rights, privileges, and immunities as
belonging to Americans. The Address of the Continental Congress to
the Inhabitants of Quebec in 1774 catalogued fundamental rights of
the English, including the rights of having a share in their own
government by representatives chosen by themselves, of habeas
corpus, of jury trial, and of freedom of the press. 2 ' The Address said
that press freedom served to advance truth, science, morality, and the
arts; to promote diffusion of liberal sentiments on administration of
government; to promote union among the people; and to shame or
intimidate oppressive officers into better behavior. These rights were
described not as belonging to this or that colony but belonging to "the
people" or the English.'22 The Address's claim for a free press right
to shame oppressive government officials went beyond the positive
law of England at the time, which treated the criticism of those in
power as seditious libel.'23 The Declaration of Independence went
even further than many of the revolutionary resolves, proclaiming
basic rights of all people to life, liberty, and the pursuit of
supra note 109, at 174).
117. Id. (quoting HOWARD, supra note 109, at 175).
118. Id. (quoting HOWARD, supra note 109, at 180).
119. Id. (quoting HOWARD, supra note 109, at 180); see also, e.g., The Address to the
Inhabitants of Quebec, 1774,1 JOURNALS OF THE AMERICAN CONGRESS: FROM 1774 TO
1788, at 40, 44 (Washington, D.C., Way & Gideon 1823) ("Privileges and immunities last
no longer than [a Minister's] smiles."), reprinted in 1 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra
note 55, at 221, 225.
120. 2 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 1774-1789, at 145 (1905); see 2
KENT, supra note 90, at 1-32.
121. See The Address to the Inhabitants of Quebec, 1774, supra note 119, at 41-43,
reprinted in 1 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 55, at 222-23.
122. Id.
123. See Rex v. Tutchin, 14 HOWELL STATE TRIALS, 1095, 1128 (1704), quoted in 2
JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 317-18
(London, MacMillan 1883). Truth was no defense. See id.
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happiness.24
Though Americans had a common heritage of liberty, they also
lived in separate states. During the Revolution, state after state
adopted new constitutions, typically with guarantees of fundamental
liberties or with separate state bills of rights. Though many of the
provisions of these state constitutions were identical, they also varied
somewhat from state to state.'21 For many people, these state
constitutions seemed to declare and secure basic common rights of
the American people, the somewhat mythical and somewhat genuine
rights of freeborn Englishmen, or the basic rights of human nature.2 6
For others, they may simply have declared the rights of Virginians or
New Yorkers. So from the beginning, Americans thought of
themselves as one people with a common heritage of liberty and as
many people with distinct heritages living in separate states. The
motto of the new nation underlined this tension-e pluribus unum,
out of many one. The new Constitution would bind Americans
together more closely as one people. In this new era, Americans
continued to refer to basic rights as privileges and immunities of
Americans.
IV. A NEW CONSTITUTION: USE OF THE WORDS "PRIVILEGES"
AND "IMMUNITIES"
A. Ratification Debates
In early discussions of the Federal Bill of Rights, speakers often
claimed it protected the pre-existing rights of the people.1 27 After the
124. See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 1 (U.S. 1776), reprinted in 1
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 55, at 251,251-52.
125. See, e.g., Virginia Declaration of Rights, 1776, reprinted in 1 DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY, supra note 55, at 234, 234-36; Pennsylvania Declaration of Rights, 1776,
reprinted in 1 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 55, at 263, 263-75; Delaware
Declaration of Rights, 1776, reprinted in 1 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 55, at
276, 276-78; Maryland Declaration of Rights, 1776, reprinted in 1 DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY, supra note 55, at 280, 280-85; North Carolina Declaration of Rights, 1776,
reprinted in 1 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 55, at 286,286-88.
126. See Letter from Richard Henry Lee to George Mason (Oct. 1, 1787), in 1 THE
DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION: FEDERALIST AND ANTIFEDERALIST SPEECHES,
ARTICLES, AND LETTERS DURING THE STRUGGLE OVER RATIFICATION 45,45 (Barnard
Bailyn ed., 1993) [hereinafter DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION] (referring to the
unwillingness in the Continental Congress to make "such changes and securities [in the
proposed Constitution] as Reason and experience prove to be necessary against the
encroachments of power upon the indispensable rights of human nature").
127. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 437, 440-41 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789) (statement of Rep.
Madison) (proposing the Bill of Rights in the first Congress), reprinted in 2
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 55, at 1012,1028-29, 1032-33.
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adoption of the Bill of Rights and by the late 1830s, references to the
Constitution as establishing or securing to all Americans the rights
enumerated in the Bill of Rights became more common.
In debates on ratification of the Constitution, basic rights were
described as "privileges" and "immunities." These included the
"great" and "darling privilege" of the writ of habeas corpus. 128
Samuel Bryan, writing in the Independent Gazetteer in 1787, warned
Pennsylvanians that certain "liberties and privileges" were "secured
to you by the constitution of this commonwealth.' 1 29 He urged his
readers to consider carefully before they "surrender these great and
valuable privileges up forever" by adopting the Federal Constitution
without a bill of rights.3 ' As apparent examples of these rights, he
listed protections from unreasonable searches, civil jury trial, and
freedom of speech and writing.13 ' Writing again a few weeks later,
Bryan noted that many nations in Europe had lost the "invaluable
privilege" of civil jury trial. A letter to James Madison defended
the Constitution against the objection of a "total want of a Bill of
Rights" because the "enumeration of those priviledges which we
retained" would have "left floating in uncertainty a number of non
enumerated contingent powers and priviledges." 3  As a result
enumeration would trench "upon the powers of the states-& of the
Citizens.,,134
Anti-Federalists feared broad national powers in a federal
constitution that lacked a bill of rights. They said that supreme
national law undermined the security of fundamental rights provided
by their state guarantees. 35 In light of the Supremacy Clause, Anti-
Federalists wisely asked, "what security does [sic] the Constitutions of
128. E.g., 2 TlE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION
OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION at 108, 137 (Jonathan Elliot ed., Philadelphia, J.B.
Lippincott Co. 2d ed. 1836) [hereinafter ELLIOT'S DEBATES] (statement of Mr. Nason)
(reprinting Massachusetts' ratification debate). The Constitution itself, of course, referred
to the right to habeas corpus as a "privilege." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
129. Samuel Bryan, A Most Daring Attempt to Establish a Despotic Aristocracy, INDEP.
GAZETTEER (Phila.), Oct. 12, 1787, (emphasis omitted) (published under the pseudonym
"Centinel"), reprinted in 1 DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 126, at 52,52.
130. Id.
131. See id.
132. Samuel Bryan, Letter, FREEMAN'S J. (Phila.), Oct. 24, 1787, reprinted in 1
DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 126, at 74, 84; see also id. at 82 (describing
civil jury trial as a "transcendent privilege").
133. Letter from George Lee Tuberville to James Madison (Dec. 11, 1787), in 1
DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 126, at 477,477.
134. Id. at 478.
135. Explicit plans to require states to obey the Bill of Rights emerged in 1789 and
later, in the era of the Fourteenth Amendment.
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the several States afford for the liberty of the press and other
invaluable personal rights, not provided for by the new plan?'
1 36
Once people had parted with their "privileges," an "Old Whig"
inaccurately warned, two-thirds of Congress would never vote for the
necessary amendment to return them. 37 In the Virginia ratifying
convention, Patrick Henry said that the Virginia Bill of Rights
secured the citizens' "most valuable fights and privileges,"'38 and he
complained that the new Constitution endangered "our rights and
privileges."' 39 According to Henry, "The rights of conscience, trial by
jury, liberty of the press, all your immunities and franchises, all
pretensions to human rights and privileges, are rendered insecure
... "140 Later Henry asked, "How does your trial by jury stand? In
civil cases gone-not sufficiently secured in criminal-this best
privilege is gone."'141 Similarly, in the North Carolina debates, J.
M'Dowall complained that even in criminal cases, trial by jury was
insufficiently secured by the Federal Constitution because the
accused was not assured a jury from the vicinage or neighborhood.
As a result, "the substance ... of this privilege is taken away.'1 42
Luther Martin's address to the Maryland legislature on the Federal
Convention of 1787 echoed this same concern, complaining that
Supreme Court jurisdiction over both law and fact was inconsistent
with the "inestimable privilege" of "trial by jury."'43
The word "privilege" was also used more broadly. For example,
Patrick Henry referred to the right to elect representatives to the
Federal House and complained that the constitutional language
would make it possible to have only one representative for each state.
Henry worried that such a provision made it too easy "to evade this
privilege.)
44
During the ratification debate, Federalists attempted to
136. Bryan, supra note 132, at 81; see George Mason, Objections to the Constitution,
VA. J. (Alexandria), Nov. 22, 1797, reprinted in 1 DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION, supra
note 126, at 345,346.
137. George Bryan et al., Letter, INDEP. GAZETTEER (Phila.), Oct. 5, 1787, reprinted
in 1 DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 126, at 122,123.
138. 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 128, at 318 (statement of Patrick Henry).
139. 3 id. at 44 (statement of Patrick Henry).
140. 3 id, (statement of Patrick Henry).
141. 3 id, at 47 (statement of Patrick Henry).
142. 4 id. at 211 (statement of J. M'Dowall).
143. Luther Martin's Letter on the Federal Convention of 1787, in 1 ELLIOT'S
DEBATES, supra note 128, at 381. In the North Carolina ratifying convention, Henry
Abbot noted concern about "the privilege of worshipping God according to their
consciences." 4 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 128, at 191 (statement of Henry Abbot).
144. 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 128, at 46 (statement of Patrick Henry).
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discourage anonymous attacks on the proposed new Constitution.
Anti-Federalists claimed that this move imperiled the freedom of the
press. One "Argus" wrote, "The Liberty of the Press, or the Liberty
which every Person in the United States at present enjoys ... is a
Privilege of infinite Importance ... for which... we have fought and
bled.' 1 45  Argus asserted that the attempt by "our aristocratical
Gentry, to have every Person's Name published who should write
against the proposed Federal Constitution, has given many of us a just
Alarm."'1
Twenty-one dissenters from ratification of the Constitution by
the Pennsylvania Convention published their reasons in December
1787.147 Prominent among these reasons was the fact that their
proposed amendments, including a bill of rights, had been rejected.
The rights that they proposed to secure by amendment included free
speech, free press, civil and criminal jury trial, a privilege against self-
incrimination, and virtually all rights later contained in the Federal
Bill of Rights. The dissenters acted, they said, "for the preservation
of those invaluable rights."'148 They continued, "It remains with you
whether you will think those inestimable privileges, which you have
so ably contended for, should be sacrificed .... ,149 Their proposed
amendments also included a provision that states would retain
sovereignty over all areas except for matters expressly delegated to
the national government (a "reservation of the rights and privileges of
the state governments"150), a provision that no treaty could override a
law of Congress until it was expressly repealed, and a larger House of
Representatives. 5'
"Privilege" was sometimes used more expansively and not
limited to a synonym for a fundamental right. When people spoke of
their invaluable privileges, it is not always clear whether they referred
to a common heritage of the American people, merely to specific
rights under state law, or to both.
In The Federalist No. 84, Alexander Hamilton defended the
145. M. Argus, Letter, PROVIDENCE U.S. CHRON., Nov. 8, 1787, reprinted in 13
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 320-21 (John
P. Kaminsky & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1981).
146. Id. at 321.
147. See The Address and Reasons of Dissent of the Minority of the Convention of the
State of Pennsylvania to Their Constituents, PA. PACKET (Phila.), Dec. 18, 1787, reprinted
in 1 DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 126, at 526,526-52.
148. Id. at 535.
149. Id-
150. Id. at 538-39.
151. See id. at 542.
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Constitution against the objection that it lacked a Bill of Rights. '
Hamilton argued in the alternative-both that the Constitution
already had a bill of rights and that such an addition would be
dangerous because it would suggest that the federal government had
powers that it did not. The proposed U.S. Constitution was like the
New York Constitution, Hamilton argued. Though there was no
separate bill of rights, "provisions in favour of particular privileges
and rights" were contained in the body of the document.153 Hamilton
cited the Constitution's Treason Clause, the prohibition on ex post
facto laws and bills of attainder, jury trial for crimes, habeas corpus,
and the prohibition on titles of nobility as examples.", The
Constitution itself was a bill of rights. One purpose of a bill of rights
was to "specify the political privileges of the citizen" and the
Constitution did that.5 5 Another purpose was to define "immunities
and modes of proceeding, which are relative to personal and private
concerns."'56 The Constitution did that also.
The use of "privilege" or "immunity" to describe fundamental
rights was common, but not universal. Some revolutionary state
constitutions listed basic rights without characterizing them as
rights; 57 often they referred to the basic protections as "rights" or
"liberties.' ' 58 And so it went throughout later American history. The
words "privilege" and "immunity" were common ways to describe
fundamental rights of the sort contained in the American Bill of
Rights. But they were not the only way, nor even the most common
way. The words "rights" and "liberties" were more often used. In
modem times it has became more common to refer to fundamental
rights as "rights" and less common to describe them as "privileges" or
"immunities." As we will see, however, the common eighteenth and




155. Id. at 536.
156. Id-
157. Connecticut Declaration of Rights, 1776, reprinted in 1 DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY, supra note 55, at 289-90.
158. Virginia Declaration of Rights, 1776, supra note 125, at 235 (declaring an accused
person's right to demand the cause and nature of his accusation); Pennsylvania
Declaration of Rights, 1776, supra note 125, at 265 (declaring the right to counsel in
criminal cases, the right to public trial by jury, and the right to be free from warrants that
fail to describe particularly the place to be searched); Vermont Declaration of Rights,
1777 (declaring the right to worship according to the dictates of conscience, the right to
counsel, and the right to be protected in life, liberty, or property), reprinted in 1
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 55, at 319,322-23.
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nineteenth century usage has not died out.
B. The First Congress: A Bill of Rights
In the first Congress, James Madison proposed a bill of rights as
an amendment to the new Constitution.'59 Madison described the
rights of free press, jury trial, and conscience as "invaluable
privileges" and as the "choicest privileges of the [American] people,"
and he proposed to safeguard these "privileges" against both state
and federal violations."6 He described the proposed bill of rights as
securing the "rights and privileges of the people of America."'' It is
noteworthy that Madison thought of his amendment as providing
security for existing privileges. When he advocated limits on the
states to protect free press, jury trial, and the rights of conscience, he
said that there was no reason not to have a "double security" for
these rights of the people. 16 The House added freedom of speech to
the list, and, with that addition, it passed Madison's limitation on the
states. 63  Madison's plan to require the states to obey these
"invaluable privileges," however, was defeated in the Senate.'
4
Madison's remarks and draft amendments show that he assumed
that the American people possessed certain rights as a common
heritage of liberty. He saw his proposed bill of rights as protecting
these rights, even though there was no Federal Bill of Rights when he
spoke, and some rights-such as press freedom-were not listed in all
state constitutions. Madison distinguished between the rights
(assumed somehow to exist) and the security device provided by
explicit guarantees of these rights. He thought bills of rights provided
security for the rights and that a limit on the states would provide a
"double security."'1 5 Madison warned that "State Governments are
as liable to attack the invaluable privileges as the General
Government is."'6 The first clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
159. See 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 424, 426-27, 431, 436, 441, 738 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789)
(statement of Rep. Madison), reprinted in 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 55, at
1017,1019-20, 1023, 1028,1033, 1096.
160. Id. at 436, 441 (statement of Rep. Madison), reprinted in 2 DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY, supra note 55, at 1028,1033.
161. Id. at 738 (statement of Rep. Madison), reprinted in 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY,
supra note 55, at 1096.
162. Id. at 441 (statement of Rep. Madison), reprinted in 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY,
supra note 55, at 1033.
163. See 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 55, at 1050-53.
164. See id. at 1145-46.
165. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 441 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789) (statement of Rep. Madison),
reprinted in 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 55, at 1033.
166. Id. (statement of Rep. Madison) (emphasis added).
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follows the general outlines of Madison's plan by protecting Bill of
Rights liberties against state action, providing that "[n]o State shall"
deny due process of law to any person nor shall any state abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States. The clause
adds Madison's proposed double security for rights such as free
speech, jury trial, and free exercise of religion by providing that "[n]o
State shall" abridge privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States. 67
Later in the 1789 debate on the Judiciary Bill before the First
Congress, Senator William Maclay of Pennsylvania objected to a
provision that he thought imperiled the right to trial by jury. As
recorded in his journal, he said:
[T]he barr between Chancery [which tried cases without a
jury] and Common law is broken down.... [A]ll actions may
now be tryed in the federal Courts by the Judges, without
the intervention of a Jury. The Tryal by Jury is considered
as the Birth right of every american, it is a priviledge they
are fond of, and let me add it is a priviledge they will not
part with.16
Americans had struggled to add privileges such as free speech
and free press to the Constitution. By 1798, those invaluable
privileges were under siege.
C. The Alien and Sedition Acts
In 1798, the Congress passed the Alien and Sedition Acts. 9 The
Alien Act allowed the President summarily to deport those aliens he
considered dangerous. 70 The Sedition Act made it a crime to make
false and malicious criticisms of the President (John Adams) or the
Congress, but not of the Vice President (Thomas Jefferson, Adams'
167. Compare U.S. CONST., amend. XIV, § 1 ("No State shall make or enforce any law
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States .... -),
with 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 435 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789) (statement of Rep. Madison)
(adopting the "no State shall" language to protect the rights of press, conscience, and jury
trial from state denial), reprinted in 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 55, at 1027.
Representative Bingham, the primary sponsor on Section 1, stated that he relied on Chief
Justice Marshall's statement in Barron v. Mayor of Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833),
that had the framers of the original Bill of Rights intended to limit the states, they would
have used the "no State shall" language. See CURTIS, No STATE SHALL ABRIDGE, supra
note 22, at 161; see also AMAR, supra note 22, at 163-65 (offering an elegant textual
analysis bearing on the same point); Crosskey, supra note 21, at 89 (same).
168. THE DIARY OF WILLIAM MACLAY AND OTHER NOTES ON SENATE DEBATES
109 (Kenneth R. Bowling & Helen E. Veit eds., 1988) (emphasis added).
169. Act of July 14,1798, ch. 73,1 Stat. 596 (1798) (expired).
170. See SMITH, supra note 91, at 35-93 (describing the Alien Act).
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likely opponent in the election of 1800).1 1 The Sedition Act was a
defining constitutional moment in American history. Adams' defeat,
the expiration of the Sedition Act, and Jefferson's decision to pardon
all convicted violators helped to establish that criticism of
government officials would not be punished as a crime and that
political opposition would be legitimate in America. During this
controversy, basic rights such as freedom of speech and of the press
often were described as privileges of the people at large, and of
American citizens. The federal and state constitutions were referred
to as declaring and safeguarding such privileges.
But there are crosscurrents here as well. Some Republicans,
such as Thomas Jefferson, emphasized the total lack of federal power
over speech and said that the states had control over abuses of
speech. At times, Jefferson almost seemed to suggest that the
problem with the Sedition Act was simply that the wrong government
enacted it. 72 Most Jeffersonian Republicans, however, insisted on a
basic right of Americans to criticize public men and public
measures.
173
Republicans attacked the Sedition Act as a violation of freedom
of press and as an exercise of powers not delegated to the United
States. Federalists, who had a narrower view of free press and a
broader view of federal power, defended the Act. Both, however,
often described free speech and press as privileges of the American
people.
For example, Massachusetts Federalist Harrison Gray Otis
defended the Sedition Act in debates in the House of
Representatives. Otis said "that most unusual attempts were made to
171. See supra text accompanying note 169.
172. See, e.g., Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Norvell (June 11, 1807), reprinted
in FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, supra note 105, at 372, 372; Letter from Thomas Jefferson to
Abigail Adams (Sept. 11, 1804) reprinted in FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, supra note 105, at
366, 367; Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Thomas McKean (Feb. 19, 1803), reprinted in
FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, supra note 105, at 364, 364; see also WILLIAM W. VAN
ALSTYNE, FIRST AMENDMENT: CASES AND MATERIALS 22 n.34 (2d ed. 1995) (reporting
Professor St. George Tucker's belief that no power over speech was to be exercised by the
federal government," 'leaving it to the state governments to exercise such control over the
subject, as their several constitutions and laws permit' " (quoting St. George Tucker,
Appendix, in 2 BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES: WITH NOTES OF REFERENCE TO THE
CONSTITUTION AND LAWS OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES;
AND OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA app. 29 (Philadelphia, William Young Birch
& Abraham Small, 1803)).
173. See, e.g., Virginia Resolutions, Dec. 21, 1798, reprinted in 1 DOCUMENTS OF
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL HISTORY 160 (Melvin I. Urofsky ed., 1989)
[hereinafter DOCUMENTs OF AMERICAN HISTORY].
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deceive the people and alarm their fears, that they were threatened
with the deprivation of a darling privilege." 74 He insisted, however,
that this was not so. Otis explained that "[t]hey were still at liberty
... to use their tongues and their pens, like all other property, so as to
do no wanton and unjustifiable injury to others."'175 Similarly, in 1801,
a Federalist who advocated extension of the Sedition Act described
"liberty of speech and of the press" as "privileges to be prized above
all others.' 1 76 Claims that these privileges had been abused, he said,
would be decided by an impartial jury, another "privilege.' '177
Congressman Livingston, a Jeffersonian Republican from New
York, saw the matter differently. He said, "The Constitution seems
to have contemplated ... that majorities ... might be actuated by
dispositions ... to pass laws to suppress the only means by which its
corrupt views might be made known to the people .... -"178 Therefore,
the Constitution had provided that "no law shall be passed to abridge
the liberty of speech and of the press. This privilege," Livingston
continued, "is connected with another dear and valuable privilege-
the liberty of conscience.'
79
A resolution from inhabitants of Woodford, Kentucky, attacked
the Sedition Act as a "direct" violation of the Constitution and an
outrage "against our most valuable rights: that to speak, write, and
censure freely, are privileges of which freemen cannot divest
themselves, much less be abridged in them by others.""18  For
"servants of the people to tell those who created them, that they shall
not, at their peril, examine into the conduct of, nor censure those
servants, for the abuse of power committed to them," the resolution
irately continued, "is tyranny more insufferable than Asiatic
slavery."' 81 The resolution insisted that free speech, press, and jury
trial were "among the inseparable rights of freemen."'82 Similarly, a
meeting of citizens of Fayette County and adjoining Kentucky
counties resolved that "the privilege of speaking and publishing our
sentiments on all public questions" was "unequivocally acknowledged
and secured to us by the constitution of this state as well as that of the
174. 8 ANNALS OF CONG. 2151 (1798) (statement of Rep. Otis).
175. Id- (statement of Rep. Otis).
176. 10 ANNALS OF CONG. 917 (1801) (statement of Rep. Platt).
177. Id- (statement of Rep. Platt).
178. 8 ANNALS OF CONG. 2153 (1798) (statement of Rep. Livingston).
179. Id. (statement of Rep. Livingston) (second emphasis added).
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United States," and the resolution said that laws to impair these rights
were void.' s3
The Boston Independent Chronicle printed a piece written in
Newark, New Jersey, which warned that force was resorted to against
"the dreadful ORDEAL of free discussions.-But can a law," the
writer asked, "founded on a violated Constitution, repress a sacred
right vested in every freeman by the immutable law of nature?""s
The writer noted that the violent mob attacks on the Republican
Philadelphia Aurora, a Jeffersonian paper, had increased its
circulation. The increased support was caused by "freemen indignant
at the ... attempt to abridge a right solemnly guaranteed by the
Constitution. ' ' s" The writer claimed that even friends of the
government were revolted at "being compelled to resign their dear
bought privileges.'
1 86
The Philadelphia Aurora published an address on the then-
upcoming presidential election.' 7 It attacked the Sedition Act. Part
of the writer's objection was based on lack of federal power and
appealed to states' rights. A second objection was based on the
restriction of the substantive liberty, however, and the two objections
were linked together. The Sedition Act had taken seditious libel from
state courts where, the writer optimistically announced, independent
and upright judges and juries would recognize that criticism of public
officials was not a criminal act but a public duty and that truth could
never be a libel. The essay suggested that the Sedition Act was "not
only a breach of the constitution, but an open attack of party, on the
liberty of speech and of the press, and of the dearest rights of the
people.""' The Act undermined "that free investigation of our public
measures which we supposed the constitution had secured to all our
citizens.' 8 9 People understood that the Bill of Rights meant that
183. Spirit of the Times, Kentucky, INDEP. CHRON. (Boston), Oct. 1-4, 1798, at 1
(emphasis added); see Spirit of the Times, Albany, INDEP. CHRON. (Boston), Dec. 6-10,
1798, at 1; Spirit of the Times, Kentucky, INDEP. CHRON. (Boston), Oct. 18-22, 1798, at 1;
Spirit of the Times, Knoxville, INDEP. CHRON. (Boston), Nov. 15-19, 1798, at 1; Virginia,
INDEP. CHRON. (Boston), Oct. 8-12, 1798, at 1. For a states' rights argument, see, for
example, Massachusetts Legislature, Dr. Hill's Speech, INDEP. CHRON. (Boston), Feb. 21,
1799, at 2.
184. Newark, N.J., Sept. 18, INDEP. CHRON. (Boston), Sept. 24-27,1798, at 3.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. See On the Election of the President of the United States, No. IV, AURORA (Phila.),
Oct. 23, 1800, at 2.
188. On the Election of the President of the United States, No. II, AURORA (Phila.), Oct.
20, 1800, at 3.
189. Id.
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the rights of religion, of the press and of jury, are sacredly
preserved to us; the people have by their constitution
prevented congress or the general government from ever
altering them; no authority inferior to that of the people can
now touch them-such as they are, with all their privileges at
the adoption of their amendment, such are they to remain.19
In 1800, the Federalist Senate sought to arrest and punish
William Duane, editor of a leading Republican newspaper, for
allegedly violating the privileges of the Senate by publishing the text
of a bill under consideration. 9' The bill was a Federalist proposal for
a Federalist dominated commission to resolve electoral disputes in
the upcoming presidential election. 92 Senator Stevens Thomson
Mason of Virginia urged the Senate
to view the delicacy of the situation in which they would be
involved while defining their new discovered privileges and
subverting the old acknowledged privilege of the liberty of
the press ... for the public mind had already been
considerably agitated, at what many conceived to be an
unconstitutional exercise of power-if session after session,
attempts were made to fetter the freedom of the press, the
people of the Untied States would watch with anxious
regard every movement of this body.193
Complaints about the Sedition Act did not merely appeal to the
right of Americans to free speech and press. Republicans also cited
both the Tenth Amendment and state constitutional guarantees
showing the unconstitutionality of the Sedition Act.194 Although
many appealed to the right of free speech and press enshrined in the
national Bill of Rights, these people did not suggest that the federal
government had power under the Constitution to stop state
abridgements of free speech. Indeed, some suggested that abuses of
the right were state law questions. 95 When Massachusetts prosecuted
Republican editors under the state common law of sedition, the
defendants appealed to their state constitutional guarantees. 196
190. On the Election of the President of the United States, No. II, AURORA (Phila.),
Oct. 21, 1800, at 3 (citation omitted).
191. See SMITH, supra note 91, at 288-306.
192. See id.
193. Debate in Senate, Wednesday, March 5, AURORA (Phila.), Mar. 18, 1800, at 3
(emphasis added) (summarizing proceedings in the Senate).
194. See, e.g., Virginia Resolutions, Dec. 21, 1798, supra note 173, at 159-60; 6 THE
WRirINGS OF JAMES MADISON 326-31 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1906).
195. See VAN ALSTYNE, supra note 172, at 22 n.34 (quoting Tucker, supra note 172, at
app. 29).
196. See Trial of Mr. Abijah Adams on the Charge of Sedition, INDEP. CHRON.
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Thomas Jefferson would sometimes refer to basic rights as
belonging to all Americans, not simply to citizens of states that chose
to protect the rights. In 1814, Thomas Jefferson wrote about a state
court blasphemy prosecution for the sale of a book: "I am really
mortified to be told that, in the United States of America, a fact like
this can become a subject of inquiry, and of criminal inquiry too, as an
offense against religion ... ."197 Jefferson did not contend that the
prosecution was barred by the First Amendment, but he asked: "Is
this then our freedom of religion?"'198 As his italicized "United States
of America" and his reference to "our freedom of religion" indicate,
for Jefferson there was a freedom of religion for Americans quite
separate from the question of whether state courts or state law
respected it. On this occasion, at least, the privilege was national and
distinct from the remedy for its violation. 99
Early American usage of "privileges" and "immunities" left
unresolved basic issues of federalism, but it was clear that the words
were used to describe constitutional rights. Before the Revolution,
Americans had been British subjects claiming all the rights, privileges,
and immunities of freeborn Englishmen. After the Revolution,
Americans established a new government, at first something like a
confederacy of independent states. With the Constitution they
established a much stronger central government. Their common
heritage led them to think of themselves alternately as both citizens
of their states and of the United States, as Americans and Virginians
or citizens of Massachusetts. It also led Americans to think of their
rights as existing independently-as an English heritage or, for some,
as a heritage from a mythical golden age of Anglo-Saxon liberty or as
basic rights of all human beings. They tended to think of federal and
state constitutional guarantees as security devices to protect their
rights, privileges, or immunities. When Americans referred to their
basic rights (or "privileges"), they sometimes referred to state
constitutions, sometimes to the Federal Constitution, and sometimes
to both. But they often insisted that basic rights belonged to
Americans and described the Federal Constitution as establishing or
declaring rights or privileges and immunities of Americans, as
opposed, for example, to simply declaring a lack of power by the
national government.
(Boston), Apr. 11-15,1799, at 1.
197. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to N.G. Dufief (Apr. 19, 1814), in THOMAS
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So, not only were rights such as those in the Bill of Rights
commonly described as privileges, but also they were often spoken of
as belonging to all Americans, as being privileges of citizens of the
United States. Though such usage existed quite early in American
history, it grew more common in the thirty years or so before the Civil
War. The Bill of Rights itself-which was read by many lawyers and
laymen alike as a people's charter and not a "lawyer's contract"2 '-
nourished the idea that all Americans possessed certain basic rights
by virtue of the national Constitution. Nevertheless, the idea that all
Americans were entitled to these privileges did not, at first,
necessarily imply that they were enforceable against the states in
federal courts or by the national government.
D. The Crusade Against Slavery (1830-1860) and the Privileges and
Immunities of American Citizens
Many Jeffersonian Republicans were sanguine about state power
and state protection of fundamental privileges of Americans. As
slavery became a central political issue, Southern states passed laws
banning anti-slavery speech, and Southerners searched visitors for
anti-slavery literature and whipped those found with it001 As a result,
the comfortable assumption that citizens' liberties could be safely
entrusted to state power became difficult for many Americans to
accept.= The Civil War and the post-Civil War Amendments
reflected a growing conviction that security for liberty must be
national to be meaningful.
In the years from 1830 to the Civil War, people increasingly
described Bill of Rights liberties, such as free speech and free press,
as "privileges" or "rights" of "American citizens," continued to use
the words "privilege" and "right" as equivalents, and began with
increasing intensity to assert that state denials of these rights were
illegitimate and in some sense violated the rights in the Federal
Constitution °3 Such claims were made even though the Supreme
Court had ruled in 1833 that the guarantees of the Federal Bill of
200. President Franklin D. Roosevelt used this phrase to describe the Constitution in
his speech commemorating its 150th anniversary. See Franklin D. Roosevelt, The
Constitution of the United States Was a Layman's Document, Not a Lawyer's Contract,
reprinted in 1937 THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT
359-66 (Samuel I. Rosenman ed., 1941). Large portions of the speech are set out in 2
BRUCE AcKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS 377-79 (1998).
201. See, e.g., Curtis, Crisis over Helper's Book, supra note 16, at 1151-77.
202. See iL
203. See, e.g., Curtis, Lovejoy, supra note 16, at 1147-59,1171-76,1184.
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Rights did not impose limits on the states.2°4
Because usage of the terms "privilege" and "immunity" from
1830 to 1866 has been set out extensively elsewhere, I will discuss
only a few examples. °5 In 1836, the New York Evening Post wrote
that "[t]o entertain and express freely any opinion respecting our
political institutions, is the privilege of all who live under a
democratick government.' '206 An 1836 meeting in Willoughby, Ohio,
proclaimed "[t]he unquestionable right of all persons in this republic,
to discuss every subject pertaining to its welfare,"2°7 including slavery.
The "constitution of the United States," the meeting insisted,
"protects us in so doing."208 Though the statement does not use the
word "privilege" or "immunity," it shows an understanding that free
discussion was a right of citizens of the United States, protected by
the Federal Constitution. Examples that follow also show that
"privilege" or "immunity" was often used to mean "right" or
protection for the right.
Abolitionists faced explicit demands that they abandon anti-
slavery agitation. In the mid 1830s, violent mobs in the North
dispersed their meetings and attempted to suppress their
newspapers. 9 Southern states demanded that Northern states pass
laws to suppress abolitionist agitation.210 In reaction to such
suppression efforts, the call for a New York anti-slavery society
convention warned that "the privileges of the free are now doomed as
a sacrifice on the altar of perpetual slavery.... [W]e shall speedily be
all free or all slaves together. '21' The platform of the Convention
resolved "that free enquiry and discussion is the corner stone of
liberty ... and that it is the RIGHT of American citizens to discuss
the subject of slavery as well any other subject; and to express their
opinions freely, and fully; privately, and openly."' It denounced
204. See Permoli v. New Orleans, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 589, 609-10 (1845); Barron v.
Mayor of Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243,250-51 (1833).
205. See Michael Kent Curtis, Two Textual Adventures: Thoughts on Reading Jeffrey
Rosen's Paper, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1269, 1275-80 (1998); supra note 22 (citing
authorities).
206. N.Y. EVENING POST, July 14,1836, at 2.
207. From the Cleveland Whig, PHILANTHROPIST (New Richmond, Ohio), Mar. 11,
1836, at 4.
208. Id
209. See Curtis, Curious History, supra note 16, at 809-17.
210. See id.
211. PROCEEDINGS OF THE NEW YORK ANTI-SLAVERY CONVENTION HELD AT
UTICA, OCTOBER 21, AND NEw YORK ANTI-SLAVERY STATE SOCIETY HELD AT
PETERBORO, OCTOBER 22,1835, at 3 (Utica, N.Y., Standard & Democrat Office 1835).
212. Id at 12.
2000] 1111
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
attempts to interfere with this freedom as an exercise of illegal power,
and "an infringement on rights given us, by God, and guaranteed to
us by the constitution of the United States, and of the individual
states. '213  Free discussion, the platform continued, was a right
abolitionists would never relinquish: "This high constitutional
privilege we shall assert, and exercise in all places, and at all times.
'214
The people, they said, should abandon "principles, opinions, [and]
institutions ... which cannot bear thorough examination and
inquiry. "215
Nor was such usage limited to abolitionists. In the mid 1830s,
Congress considered and rejected federal legislation designed to
prevent mailing abolitionist publications to the South or, in a later
version, to prevent their delivery once they arrived.216 One of the
critics of the legislation was Senator Davis of Massachusetts. Davis
insisted that the First Amendment meant "that Congress shall not
diminish the freedom of the press.... The right is a reserved right
and we are forbidden to touch it."2 17 Constitutional grants of power
were made on the condition that "this privilege was to remain
unimpaired." 218 He took a functional view both of the post office and
of the press: "The naked right to print, without the right to publish
would be a humble privilege. '219 Davis noted that since the time of
the framing of the Constitution, a major facet of publishing was
transmission of periodicals through the mail.z 0 Like others before
him, Davis described free press as a basic constitutional privilege,
though he recognized that the national guarantee did not limit the
states.
When Elijah Lovejoy, a minister and anti-slavery newspaper
editor, was killed by an anti-abolition mob in 1837, much of the
nation's press protested the killing and reported protests by other
citizens.' Many denounced the assault on free speech that was
symbolized by Lovejoy's murder even though they rejected the ideas
of the abolitionists. In response to the killing, the Baltimore Lutheran
213. I.
214. Ld. at 13.
215. Id. at 16.
216. See generally Curtis, Curious History, supra note 16, at 823-35 (describing the
congressional debate on the postal bill). For a synopsis of the legislation, see CONG.
GLOBE, 24th Cong., 1st Sess. 150 (1836).
217. 12 CONG. DEB. 1151-52 (1836) (statement of Sen. Davis).
218. Id at 1152 (statement of Sen. Davis) (emphasis added).
219. Id. (statement of Sen. Davis) (emphasis added).
220. See id. (statement of Sen. Davis).
221. See Curtis, Lovejoy, supra note 16, at 1145-50.
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Observer noted:
"Freedom of opinion and of the press is an inalienable
privilege secured to us by our political magna charta [sic] as
well as by the original inherent right of our nature, and it is
impossible that the citizens of this free and enlightened
republic should consent to surrender this inestimable
privilege in the present age of liberal view."'
Lawyers were prominent in many of the public meetings held to
protest Lovejoy's death. The meetings typically disclaimed any
connection with abolitionistsPm A meeting of young men in New
York resolved that "the liberty of the press, of speech, and the right
of petition, are among the greatest blessings and proudest
prerogatives of a free people," and "that their exercise is guaranteed
to every citizen by the Federal Constitution."' 4 Assailing these rights
was "an encroachment upon the rights of citizens, and a direct and
fatal attack" on that "sacred instrument which unites us as one
people." 1 The resolution also described free speech as a privilege,
and as we have seen that word was commonly used to describe First
Amendment freedoms. The resolution suggested that these were
rights of citizens of the United States. The New York Daily News said
that Lovejoy's killers were "'violators of the rights and privileges of
American citizens.' "6 The New Hampshire Courier considered it
disgraceful that local authorities had failed to protect Lovejoy, who
was" 'battling to protect the freedom of speech, and of the press and
of all the sacred rights secured to the citizens by the Constitution of
these U.S.' "227
Once again, throughout this period the words "rights" and
"privileges" were often treated as synonymous. For example, the
Newark Daily Advertiser described" 'the right of free discussion' " as
an "'inalienable privilege of a freeman.' "n8 The Berkshire Courier
insisted that" 'Liberty of speech must not be surrendered. It was one
of the privileges left us by our fathers.' "229
222. Testimonies of the Spirit of Liberty, 2 EMANCIPATOR 129 (Dec. 21, 1837) (quoting
the Baltimore Lutheran Observer).
223. See, e.g., Curtis, Lovejoy, supra note 16, at 1148-49.
224. Meeting of Young Men in New York, 2 EMANCIPATOR 154 (Feb. 1,1838).
225. Id
226. The Voice of the Public Press, 2 EMANCIPATOR 120 (Nov. 30, 1837) (quoting the
New York Daily News).
227. Testimonies of a Free Press, EMANCIPATOR ExTRA, Feb. 12, 1838, at 2 (quoting
the New Hampshire Courier).
228. The Voice of the Public Press, supra note 226, at 120 (quoting the Newark Daily
Advertiser).
229. Testimonies of a Free Press, supra note 227, at 3 (quoting the Berksire Courier).
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In 1838, anti-slavery and Free Soil activist Seymour B. Treadwell
published American Liberties and American Slavery.23° In his book,
Treadwell insisted on a federal constitutional right to criticize slavery
in the Southern states. Southerners could come North and criticize
Northern institutions (and even advocate slavery, as many opponents
of slavery pointed out), and no one attempted "to abridge their
liberty of speech, or suppress their freedom of opinion, for they are
American citizens, still under the gratefully waving banner of the
American constitution."'" Treadwell rejected the claim that "the
States are so many independent nations, and that they may enact laws
abridging the constitutional liberties of American citizens. ' '232
Treadwell did not use the word "privilege" or "immunity," but he did
suggest that the liberty or freedom of speech and press were national
rights belonging to all citizens of the United States that no state
should abridge.3 3 Because these liberties were commonly described
as privileges, the evidence from Treadwell supports the proposition
that they were understood to be privileges or immunities "of citizens
of the United States." If free speech is described as a right or liberty
of citizens of the United States and if "right" or "liberty" is
synonymous with "privilege" or "immunity," then free speech is a
privilege or immunity of citizens of the United States.
In the years leading up to the Civil War, many anti-slavery
politicians, including members of the newly formed Republican Party,
often described guarantees of the Bill of Rights as rights, privileges,
and immunities of American citizens that no state could rightfully
deny without violating the American Constitution.P In describing
Bill of Rights liberties as privileges or immunities, anti-slavery
activists were following common usage. As Akhil Amar has noted in
his book on the Bill of Rights:
[I]n an 1835 opinion on whether inhabitants of the Arkansas
Territory could lawfully take steps toward forming a state
government in the absence of congressional authorization
[Attorney General Benjamin Butler wrote that territorial
inhabitants] "undoubtedly possess the ordinary privileges
and immunities of citizens of the United States. Among
those is the right of the people 'peaceably to assemble and
230. SEYMOUR B. TREADWELL, AMERICAN LIBERTIES AND AMERICAN SLAVERY:
MORALLY AND POLITICALLY ILLUSTRATED (Negro Univ. Press 1969) (1838).
231. I& at 57.
232. I& at 177-78.
233. See id.
234. See, e.g., Curtis, Crisis over Helper's Book, supra note 16, at 1151-59,1170-74.
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petition the government for the redress of grievances.' "I
Indeed, as Arnold T. Guminski and Akhil Amar have noted, in
the years before the Civil War, Congress had entered into a number
of treaties in which inhabitants of newly acquired territories were
granted "all the privileges, rights, and immunities of citizens of the
United States" or all "the rights, advantages, and immunities of
citizens of the United States. 'z6
In his 1841 Inaugural Address, President William Henry
Harrison noted that the American Constitution both granted and
withheld power. As President Harrison explained, "there are certain
rights possessed by each individual American citizen which in his
compact with the others he has never surrendered." 7  Harrison
compared American sovereignty to that exercised in ancient Greece
or Rome. American sovereignty, he said,
can interfere with no one's faith, prescribe forms of worship
for no one's observance, inflict no punishment but after
well-ascertained guilt, the result of investigation under rules
prescribed by the Constitution itself. These precious
privileges, and those scarcely less important of giving
expression to his thoughts and opinions, either by writing or
speaking, unrestrained but by the liability for injury to
others, ... [were basic human rights, not merely rights
conferred by constitutions] .
8
In President Harrison's view, such rights flowed from no charter
granted by one's fellow man. Instead, the limited sovereignty of the
United States recognized these rights that each American claimed
"because he is himself a man, fashioned by the same Almighty hand
as the rest of his species."' 39
Men were not the only people claiming basic rights or privileges
and immunities. Women's rights advocates claimed for women all the
"rights and privileges which belong to them as citizens of the United
States"2' or "all the rights, privileges, and immunities of citizens.
241
235. AMAR, supra note 22, at 168 (citing 20p. Att'y Gen. 726,732-33 (1835)).
236. Guminski, supra note 79, at 783-91; see AMAR, supra note 22, at 167-69. Amar
cites an opinion of Circuit Justice Johnson, reprinted in American Insurance Co. v. Cantor,
26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511, 515, 517 (1828), which reiterates the use of this language to describe
the Bill of Rights. See AMAR, supra note 22, at 167.
237. William Henry Harrison, Inaugural Address of William Henry Harrison, March 4,
1841, in INAUGURAL ADDRESSES OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES FROM
GEORGE WASHINGTON 1789 TO HARRY S. TRUMAN 1946, at 63,64 (1952).
238. Id. at 64-65 (emphasis added).
239. Iad at 65.
240. AMAR, supra note 22, at 260-61 n.* (quoting Elizabeth Cady Stanton, This Is the
Negro's Hour, in 2 HISTORY OF WOMAN SUFFRAGE 94, 94 n.* (Elizabeth Cady Stanton et
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Abolitionist legal theorist Joel Tiffany, following a common
usage, described the rights in the Federal Bill of Rights as privileges
and immunities of citizens of the United States.242 When he insisted
that federal courts could declare state acts that violated these rights
void, that slaves were citizens, and that the federal courts could
enforce the privileges and immunities of slave citizens-such as the
right not to be deprived of liberty without due process and to habeas
corpus-to free them from bondage, he expressed what then was the
view of a minority.
2 43
E. On the Eve of the Civil War
As Dean Richard Aynes has noted, past grievances are an
important way of understanding a constitutional amendmentO 44 The
grievances that arose out of the struggle against "the slave power"
went well beyond suppression of free speech, press, and religion.2 45
They included interference with the right to bear arms, freedom from
unreasonable searches and seizures, claims of violation of the Fifth
Amendment right to due process, claims of violation of the Sixth and
Seventh Amendment rights to jury trial, and infliction of cruel and
al eds., Rochester, N.Y., Charles Mann 1887)).
241. Id at 260-61 (quoting Elizabeth Cady Stanton, Seneca Falls Declaration of 1848,
in 1 HISTORY OF WOMAN SUFFRAGE 70, 71 (Elizabeth Cady Stanton et al eds.,
Rochester, N.Y., Charles Mann 2d ed. 1889)).
After the Civil War, Victoria Woodhull sought to persuade Congress to enact
women's suffrage by enforcing the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. See H.R. REP. NO. 41-22, pt. 1, at 4 (1871), reprinted in THE
RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS' DEBATES, supra note 89, at 466-67; BARBARA
GOLDSMITH, OTHER POWERS: THE AGE OF SUFFRAGE, SPIRITUALISM, AND THE
SCANDALOUS VICTORIA WOODHULL 247-51 (1998) (presenting a recent account). But
see H.R. REP. No. 41-22, pt. 2, at 16 (1871) (presenting the minority view agreeing with
Victoria Woodhull's call for women's suffrage), reprinted in THE RECONSTRUCTION
AMENDMENTS' DEBATES, supra note 89, at 466-67. The majority of the House Judiciary
Committee recommended rejecting the petition. See H.R. REP. No. 41-22, pt. 1, at 4,
reprinted in THE RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS' DEBATES, supra note 89, at 466-67.
Several Republicans had insisted in the debates over the Fourteenth Amendment that the
right to vote was not one of the privileges or immunities of all citizens of the United States
(noting that women as well as many Americans of African descent did not enjoy the
right), and in 1871 most Republicans continued to take that position. See CURTIS, No
STATE SHALL ABRIDGE, supra note 22, at 168.
242. See CURTIS, NO STATE SHALL ABRIDGE, supra note 22, at 42-44; JOEL TIFFANY,
TREATISE ON THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF AMERICAN SLAVERY 55-58, 84-96, 139-
40 (Miami, Mnemosyne Publishing Co. 1969) (1849).
243. See TIFFANY, supra note 242, at 55-58,84-96,139-40.
244. See Richard Aynes, Refined Incorporation and the Fourteenth Amendment, 33 U.
RICHMOND L. REv. 289,290-93 (1999).
245. Id
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unusual punishments.?' The most common grievance was attempts to
suppress anti-slavery speech, press, and religious activity.247
In 1860, Congress was in an uproar over Republican
endorsement of a book by Hinton Helper that called on non-
slaveholding Southerners to unite for political action against
slavery.2' Southern congressmen and senators saw the book as a call
for slave revolts, and, indeed, it had a few combative passages about
what could be done if the slaveholding elite attempted to suppress
democratic action against slavery by violence.24 9 In the ensuing
debate, Owen Lovejoy, a Republican congressman from Illinois,
insisted on "the right of discussing this question of slavery anywhere,
on any square foot of American soil ... to which the privileges and
immunities of the Constitution extend.""2  "[Tjhat Constitution,"
Lovejoy continued, "guaranties to me free speech ... ,251
Representative Elbert Martin of Virginia warned Lovejoy, "if you
come among us we will ... hang you." 2  Congressman Lovejoy
replied, "I have no doubt of it." 3
In the uproar over Helper's book, Republicans in the Senate
voted for an unsuccessful resolution that proclaimed that "free
discussion of the morality and expediency of slavery should never be
interfered with by the laws of any State, or of the United States; and
the freedom of speech and of the press, on this and every other
subject... should be maintained inviolate in all the States." 4
Though most Republicans in the House had signed an
endorsement of Helper's book and had contributed money to print an
abridged version as a campaign document, circulators of the book in
Southern states were treated as felons, subject to whipping,
imprisonment, or worse.255 In North Carolina, Wesleyan minister and
Republican activist Daniel Worth was convicted of giving the book to
whites and sentenced to prison. The state supreme court upheld the
246. See id.; see also CURTIS, No STATE SHALL ABRIDGE, supra note 22, at 34-56
(setting out Republican complaints about slave state denials of civil liberty).
247. See Curtis, Crisis over Helper's Book, supra note 16, at 1147-67.
248. See generally id at 1141-59 (outlining Congress' response to Hinton Helper's
controversial book).
249. See id. at 1141-44.
250. CoNG. GLOBE, 36th Cong., 1st Sess. 205 (1860) (statement of Rep. Lovejoy).
Owen Lovejoy was the brother of Elijah-the editor slain by a mob in 1837. See supra
notes 221-27 and accompanying text.
251. Id (statement of Rep. Lovejoy).
252. CONG. GLOBE, 36th Cong., 1st Sess. 205 (1860) (statement of Rep. Martin).
253. Id. at 207 (statement of Rep. Lovejoy).
254. Id. at 2321 (setting forth an amendment by Sen. Harlan).
255. See Curtis, Crisis over Helper's Book, supra note 16, at 1159-67.
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conviction and did not even mention state constitutional guarantees
of a free press5 6 A North Carolina grand jury indicted endorsers of
Helper's book and asked the Republican Governor of New York to
extradite them (including himself).5 7 Three of the seven Republicans
who sat on the committee that framed the Fourteenth Amendment-
including John Bingham, the principal author of Section 1-had
endorsed the book.5 8 So it is hardly surprising that Republicans in
1866 would be unwilling to leave final decisions on the meaning of
free speech to Southern states and courts.
A number of other Republicans in Congress complained about
the denials of free speech and other Bill of Rights liberties in the
slave states. They insisted that these actions deprived citizens of
rights or privileges secured by the Federal Constitution or of the
rights of American citizens. 9 Many Republicans in the years 1860-
66 believed that the Bill of Rights contained rights, privileges, or
immunities of all American citizens, federal rights that states were
required to respect. For example, Senator Nye of Nevada said the
Constitution protected "personal" and "natural" rights, including life,
liberty, property, freedom of speech, freedom of the press, and
freedom in the exercise of religion. Nye denied that any state had the
power to subvert or impair these rights.26° Such views, of course, were
not consistent with Barron v. Mayor of Baltimore261 and its progeny.
But like Nye, many Republicans implicitly or explicitly rejected
Barron. In doing so, they were not alone.
F. Some Courts Rejected Barron
Skepticism about the correctness of Barron v. Mayor of
Baltimore was not limited to Republicans and abolitionists. A
minority of state courts refused to follow the Supreme Court's rule
that the guarantees of the Federal Bill of Rights did not limit the
states? 62 Perhaps the most emphatic demand that state legislatures
should respect the rights protected by the Bill of Rights came from
the Supreme Court of Georgia speaking through Chief Justice Joseph
256. See State v. Worth, 52 N.C. (7 Jones) 488, 490-94 (1860); Curtis, Crisis over
Helper's Book, supra note 16, at 1159-67.
257. See Curtis, Crisis over Helper's Book, supra note 16, at 1144.
258. See id at 1174.
259. See, e.g., CURTIs, No STATE SHALL ABRIDGE, supra note 22, at 26-56.
260. See id at 40-56, 53-54, 80-81.
261. 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833) (holding that guarantees of the Bill of Rights do not
limit the states).
262. See CuRTIs, No STATE SHALL ABRIDGE, supra note 22, at 24 & 25 n.36 (citing
cases that did not follow the Supreme Court's holding).
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Henry Lumpkin. In 1846 in Nunn v. State 63 and in 1852 in Campbell
v. State,264 the Georgia Supreme Court described various rights in the
Federal Bill of Rights as "privileges"-the "privilege" of bearing
arms,265 the "privilege" of being represented by counsel and "the
privileges of an oral and cross examination.
' 21
In Nunn v. State, Chief Justice Lumpkin described the right to
bear arms as a "privilege." 7  The court held that the Georgia
legislature was required to respect the right under the Second
Amendment,2I even though the state constitution had no similar
protection.269 Though he was aware of cases holding that the Federal
Bill of Rights did not limit the states, Chief Justice Lumpkin rejected
their reasoning.2 70 Lumpkin insisted that Bill of Rights liberties were
reserved to the people, not to the states. As to these rights, he said:
State conventions, have virtually adopted them as
beacon-lights to guide and control the action of their own
legislatures, as well as that of Congress. If a well-regulated
militia is necessary to the security of the State of Georgia
and of the United States, is it competent for the General
Assembly to take away this security, by disarming the
people? What advantage would it be to tie up the hands of
the national legislature, if it were in the power of the States
to destroy this bulwark of defence?2 71
Lumpkin asserted that the court "[did] not believe that, because
the people withheld this arbitrary power of disfranchisement from
Congress, they ever intended to confer it on the local legislatures.
This right is too dear to be confided to a republican legislature."'272
He continued:
The right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition
the government for a redress of grievances; to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
263. 1 Ga. 243 (1846); see also CURTIS, No STATE SHALL ABRIDGE, supra note 22, at
24-25 (referring specifically to the right to bear arms).
264. 11 Ga. 353 (1852). For a luminous discussion of the Georgia cases, see AMAR,
supra note 22, at 169, 154-55, 177, 189. For other examples of cases holding that the Bill
of Rights limited the states, see CURTIS, No STATE SHALL ABRIDGE, supra note 22, at 25
n.36; Crosskey, supra note 21, at 141,142.
265. See Nunn, 1 Ga. at 249-51.
266. Campbell, 11 Ga. at 373-74.
267. Nunn, 1 Ga. at 247.
268. See id- at 250-51.
269. See id. at 248-50.
270. See id. at 250-51.
271. Id.
272. Id. at 250.
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unreasonable searches and seizures; in all criminal
prosecutions, to be confronted with the witness against
them; to be publicly tried by an impartial jury; and to have
the assistance of counsel for their defence, is as perfect under
the State as the national legislature, and cannot be violated by
either.273
In Campbell, Lumpkin insisted that the privilege of the accused
to confront witnesses secured by the Sixth Amendment also limited
the states. The Chief Justice wrote:
That the power to pass any law infringing on these
principles is taken from the Federal Government, no one
denies. But is it a part of the reserved rights of a State to do
this? May the Legislature of a State, for example, unless
restrained by its own Constitution, pass a law "respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech or of the press;
or the right of the people peaceably to assemble[,] and [to]
petition the [G]overnment for a redress of grievances?" If
so, of what avail, I ask, is the negation of these powers to the
General Government?2 74
The doctrine "that Congress may not exercise this power, but
that each State Legislature may do so for itself" falsely implied,
Lumpkin wrote, that "a National press and State press, were quite
separate and distinct."275 In fact, it should "constantly be borne in
mind, that notwithstanding we may have different governments ...
we have but one people; ... that it is in vain to shield them from a
blow aimed by the Federal arm, if they are liable to be prostrated by
one dealt with equal fatality by their own." 6
Like Justice Black almost 100 years later, Lumpkin had an
almost religious reverence for what he described as "the ten
amendments-but for the apparent irreverence, I would say
commandments-which were added to the Constitution."2n  What
about the states' rights to violate the liberties protected in the Bill of
Rights? "From such State rights," Lumpkin exclaimed, "good Lord
273. Id at 251. Chief Justice Lumpkin did note that "questions under some of these
amendments ... can only arise under the laws and Constitution of the United States. But
there are other provisions in them, which were never intended to be thus restricted ....
Id at 250.
274. Campbell v. State, 11 Ga. 353, 365-66 (1852) (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. I
without citation).
275. Id at 366.
276. Id
277. Id. at 368.
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deliver us!" 8  Lumpkin called for maintenance of "the great
principles of civil liberty contained in these amendments-our
American Magna Charta [sic]" against state as well as national
encroachment.279
Lumpkin was also somewhat skeptical of courts basing decisions
on natural justice because "our ideas of natural justice are vague and
uncertain, regulated by no fixed standard; the ablest and best men
differing widely upon this, as well as all other subjects." 0 The rights
in the Federal Bill of Rights, however, were a different matter
because
as to questions arising under these amendments, there is
nothing indefinite. The people of the several States, by
adopting these amendments, have defined accurately and
recorded permanently their opinion, as to the great
principles which they embrace; and to make them more
emphatic and enduring, have had them incorporated into
the Constitution of the Union-the permanent law of the
land. 1
In short, for Lumpkin, these rights or privileges were rights of all
American citizens. In both Nunn and Campbell, Lumpkin
emphasized that most of the rights were not new. Instead, they were
part of the heritage of English liberty and he cited the Magna Carta,
the English Bill of Rights, and the Act of Settlement.282 As Akhil
Amar has noted in his insightful discussion of these decisions, the
Georgia court emphasized the declaratory nature of these rights.m
G. The Civil War
Reference to basic liberties, including free speech, as privileges
of American citizens continued during the Civil War. The words
were used in this way by people on all sides of the debate. As in
earlier examples, the word "rights" and the words "privileges" and
"immunities" were often used synonymously. That was so in the
controversy that swirled around Union General Ambrose Burnside's
military arrest and military trial of Democratic politician Clement
Vallandigham for making an anti-war speech.' Resolutions
278. I at 367.
279. Id. at 368.
280. Id, at 371-72.
281. Id. at 372; see AMAR, supra note 22, at 155 (discussing Justice Lumpkin's opinion).
282. See Campbell, 11 Ga. at 365,368; Nunn v. State, 1 Ga. 243,249-50 (1846).
283. See AMAR, supra note 22, at 155 & n.*; see also Parham v. Justices, 9 Ga. 341, 349
(1851) (discussing an individual's right not to be deprived of property).
284. See Michael Kent Curtis, Lincoln, Vallandigham, and Anti-War Speech in the Civil
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protesting the Vallandigham arrest were widely reprinted in the
press. These resolutions typically quoted Daniel Webster: "'It is
the ancient and undoubted prerogative of this people to canvass
public measures and the merits of public men. It is a "home-bred
right"--a fireside privilege. It has-been enjoyed in every house,
cottage and cabin in the nation.' ,286 A typical resolution continued,
"This high constitutional privilege we shall defend and exercise in all
places; in time of war, in time of peace, and at all times." In an
article critical of the arrest, the National Intelligencer wrote that it
"believe[d] that the Government might better afford to let Mr.
Vallandigham and [abolitionist] Mr. Phillips enjoy the privilege of
'free speech' according to their respective notions of propriety, than
to proceed against either of them for words spoken in public
discussion."'
The Albany Democracy, in its widely reprinted rejoinder to
President Lincoln on the Vallandigham case, referred to federal
constitutional guarantees of free speech, search and seizure, grand
jury indictment, and jury trial. It noted that these "sacred rights and
immunities which were designed to be protected by these
constitutional guarantees have not been preserved to the people
during your administration." 289  There are a great many other
examples.20
Though a number of Republicans and opponents of slavery were
critical of the Vallandigham arrest, others defended the
administration and castigated those Republicans and abolitionists
War, 7 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 105, 107-08 (1998) [hereinafter Curtis, Lincoln-
Vallandigham].
285. See id. at 131-48.
286. E.g., "Shall We Remain Free"--Large and Enthusiastic Meeting at the City Hall,
DET. FREE PRESs, May 26, 1863, at I (emphasis added) (quoting Daniel Webster).
287. Id. (emphasis added).
288. Declaring Disloyal Sentiments, NAT'L INTELLIGENCER, May 14, 1863, at 3
(emphasis added).
289. President Lincoln Answered, DET. FREE PREss, July 7, 1863, at 2 (emphasis
added); cf., e.g., Speech of Geo. W. Houk, of Dayton, Ohio, On Personal Liberty, and the
Arbitrary Arrest, Trial and Banishment of Hon. C.L. Vallandigham, Delivered at
Bellbrook, Greene Co., 0., Aug. 22, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, Sept. 17,1863, at 1 (implying
that the Fourth Amendment, for example, involved the "right of personal immunity from
arbitrary arrest and imprisonment").
290. See, e.g., From Cincinnati" Vallandigham Returned, Cm. TRIB., June 16, 1864, at 1
(printing Vallandigham's speech at Hamilton, Ohio). Congressman Alexander Long said
that "we have just the same right to hold meetings, and discuss, and criticise, and canvass
the acts of this Administration, that they have themselves. We intend to exercise that
right, and to claim that privilege." Democratic Meeting at New Haven, CINCINNATI COM.,
Aug. 21,1863, at 2.
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who joined the Democrats in criticism. The Chicago Tribune was one
of the strongest defenders of tough measures against anti-war speech.
After noting the Vailandigham supporters' "free speech" complaint,
the paper pointedly asked "those Copperhead defenders of free
speech how much of this Constitutional and sacred privilege did their
party allow to be exercised in the South before the war broke out?"291
General Burnside suggested, in a communication widely reprinted,
that because soldiers had given up their privilege of free speech-that
"freedom of discussion and criticism"---civilians should likewise
curtail their exercise of that privilege.29
After the Vallandigham arrest and the massive criticism it
produced, General Burnside struck again. This time he seized the
Chicago Times newspaper, impounded copies of the paper, and
banned further publication.2 3 Again massive protests erupted, joined
by a number of Republicans and abolitionists.294 President Lincoln
countermanded the order 95 Celebrating one mass protest meeting,
the recently liberated Chicago Times wrote:
Wednesday was a day for Chicago to be proud of. By the
voice of her citizens she proclaimed to the world that the
right of free speech has not yet passed away; that immunity
of thought and discussion are yet among the inalienable
privileges of men born to freedom.... Twenty thousand
bold men with one acclaim decreed that speech and press
shall be untrammeled, and that despotism shall not usurp
the inborn rights of the American citizen.296
As one Republican speaker at the Chicago Times protest
meeting put it, "'[Can we deprive [the people] of this great privilege
which we have hitherto enjoyed; can we destroy the means which
contribute to the general diffusion of that intelligence which is our
pride, by wiping out the public press?' "297 No one had the right or
power, the speaker insisted, "to deprive us of any of the privileges
which are secured to an American citizen by the constitution.""29
Within a few years, the United States Supreme Court described
291. Free Speech, CII. TRIB., June 1, 1863, at 2 (emphasis added).
292. General Order No. 90, CiNCINNATI CoM., June 5,1863, at 2.
293. See Curtis, Lincoln-Vallandigham, supra note 284, at 132-34.
294. See id. at 133,145-48.
295. See id. at 132-34.
296. Free Speech-Free Press, DET. FREE PRESS, June 6, 1863, at 1 (quoting the
Chicago Times of June 5,1863) (emphasis added).
297. Id. (emphasis added); see also Immense Meeting at Chicago, DET. FREE PRESS,
June 6,1863, at I (describing protests over the closing of the Chicago Times).
298. Free Speech-Free Press, supra note 296, at 1 (emphasis added).
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another Bill of Rights liberty as a "privilege."
Shortly after the Civil War, the Supreme Court reversed the
conviction of a civilian by a military tribunal.9 In doing so, the Court
noted that a person in the military
surrenders his right to be tried by the civil courts. All other
persons, citizens of states where the courts are open, if
charged with crime, are guaranteed the inestimable privilege
of trial by jury. This privilege is a vital principle, underlying
the whole administration of criminal justice; it is not held by
sufferance, and cannot be frittered away on any plea of state
or political necessity. When peace prevails, and the
authority of the government is undisputed, there is no
difficulty of preserving the safeguards of liberty; for the
ordinary modes of trial are never neglected, and no one
wishes it otherwise; but if society is disturbed by civil
commotion-if the passions of men are aroused and the
restraints of law weakened, if not disregarded-these
safeguards need, and should receive, the watchful care of
those intrusted with the guardianship of the Constitution
and laws.3°
In short, for Democrats, abolitionists, and Republicans, for critics
and supporters of the Lincoln administration's suppression of speech
and press and military trials of civilians, the words "rights,"
"privileges," and "immunities" were used interchangeably. These
words also were used to encompass rights in the Federal Bill of Rights
such as free speech, free press, the right to assemble, jury trial, and
grand jury indictment. These typically were described as rights or
privileges or immunities of American citizens secured to them by the
Federal Constitution.
V. JUDICIAL USE OF THE WORDS "PRIVILEGES" AND
"IMMuNITIEs" BEFORE THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
A. State Court Usage Under State Law
State constitutions have provisions much like those in the
Federal Bill of Rights and have had them throughout American
history. State courts also have described such state constitutional
rights as privileges or immunities. For example, the Supreme Court
of Massachusetts used "privilege" and "immunity" to describe grand
jury indictment, which was protected by the law-of-the-land clause of
299. See Exparte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 130-31 (1866).
300. IdL at 123-24 (emphasis added).
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the state constitution. In 1857, Chief Justice Lemuel Shaw of the
Massachusetts Supreme Court noted the function served by grand
jury indictment. According to Shaw, the right protected individuals
"from an open and public accusation of crime, and from the trouble,
expense and anxiety of a public trial, before a probable cause is
established by the presentment and indictment of a grand jury, in case
of high offences." 0' 1  This right, which Chief Justice Shaw found
implicit in the law-of-the-land clause of the state constitution, was
"justly regarded as one of the securities to the innocent against hasty,
malicious and oppressive public prosecutions, and as one of the
ancient immunities and privileges of English liberty.
''13 2
Other state law examples abound. In 1849, the Supreme Court
of Ohio referred to the prohibition against double jeopardy "in the
bill of rights in the constitution of the state" as "the privilege."30 3 It
rejected a claim that a second trial-after a new trial had been
ordered as a result of the defendant's successful appeal-violated the
state guarantee against double jeopardy3 m Similarly, the California
Supreme Court referred to "a constitutional privilege of the accused
to be fully heard by his counsel. '35 In 1871, the Georgia Supreme
Court noted that its state declaration of rights guaranteed that "every
person charged with an offense against the laws shall have the
privilege and benefit of counsel.
3 6
In 1852, the Supreme Court of Texas referred to its state
constitutional guarantee of right to trial by jury in civil cases as "a
privilege secured to either party, in the ascertainment of facts," but
noted that the privilege could be waived. ° In 1853, the Georgia
Supreme Court referred to the right to criminal jury trial as "the
greatest of all privileges conferred by Magna Carta" and one
"guaranteed by our own fundamental law.''"3 1 In 1866, the same court
referred to trial by jury as a "Constitutional privilege.
''3°
In 1867, the Texas Supreme Court considered a case in which the
301. Jones v. Robbins, 74 Mass. (8 Gray) 329, 344 (1857). The passage was quoted by
Justice Stevens in Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 311 (1994) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
302. Jones, 74 Mass. (8 Gray) at 344.
303. Sutcliffe v. State, 18 Ohio 469,477-79 (1849).
304. See iL at 477-78; accord State v. Slack, 6 Ala. 676, 677 (1844) ("[I]t is the privilege
[under our bill of rights] of those who have been tried for the commission of a crime, not
to be again tried for the same offense.").
305. People v. Keenan, 13 Cal. 581,584 (1859).
306. Dean v. State, 43 Ga. 218,220 (1871).
307. Neill v. Tarin, 9 Tex. 256,259 (1852).
308. Mitchum v. State, 11 Ga. 615, 633 (1852).
309. Jenkins v. Mayor of Thomasville, 35 Ga. 145, 147 (1866).
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defendant had been prosecuted for selling malt beverages on a
Sunday, in violation of a Houston city ordinance.310 The court upheld
the ordinance against a constitutional challenge and insisted that it
did not conflict with the guarantees of religious liberty in the Texas
Declaration of Rights.3  The court cited provisions of the Texas
Constitution protecting the right to worship according to conscience
and against giving preference to any religion.1 The court said:
We are equally well satisfied that the ordinance
complained of is not obnoxious to either of these
constitutional provisions, but, in fact, has the effect to
protect the inhabitants of the city of Houston in the
unmolested enjoyment of these religious privileges, secured
by these sections of the constitution of the Republic and State.
That all people of this country shall have the right to
worship God according to the dictates of their own
consciences, or not at all, if they prefer, and that the
government shall not establish any religion for the people to
obey, or prohibit the free exercise thereof, appears to be
now the settled American doctrine, well established in the
organic law of the nation and the states. None here shall be
compelled to observe the Jewish, Mohammedan, Catholic,
or Protestant form of religion, or to embrace any at all. All
are free to embrace any religious denomination, civilized or
pagan, that his judgment or taste may dictate as the best or
preferable for him.313
The court also held, without elaboration, that the ordinance did not
violate the United States Constitution
1 4
The California Supreme Court reached a different conclusion,
holding that a Sunday closing law violated the guarantees of religious
freedom in the state constitution. 15 Here again, however, a justice
described these rights or liberties as "privileges." Each of the two
justices in the majority wrote his own opinion. Justice Burnette
insisted that the constitutional guarantee protected all people or
none: "The Constitution protects the freedom of religious profession
and worship, without regard to the sincerity or insincerity of the
worshipper.... His motives in exercising a constitutional privilege are
310. See Gabel v. City of Houston, 29 Tex. 335,337 (1867).
311. See L at 343-45.
312. See id. at 344 (citing TEx. CONST. OF 1845, art. I, § 4; CoNST. OF REPUBLIC OF
TEx. of 1836, Declaration of Rights, Fourth).
313. It at 344-45 (emphasis added).
314. See id. at 346.
315. Exparte Newman, 9 Cal. 502,510 (1858).
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matters too sacred to be submitted to judicial scrutiny." '316
These cases show that it was common for state courts to refer to
guarantees under state constitutions that were similar to rights
protected by the Bill of Rights as constitutional privileges or
immunities. It would be quite natural, then, to describe such rights as
privileges and immunities of citizens of the state. Because similar
rights were (as most understood it) guaranteed by the Federal
Constitution, it would also be quite natural to refer to federal rights
as privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States. The
Georgia Constitution of 1868, for example, forbade the state from
abridging "the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States or of this State. ' 17
B. Usage in Federal Cases
In the years before the ratification of the Fourteenth
Amendment in 1868, the criminal jurisdiction of the federal courts
was limited to a small number of federal crimes, and relatively few
questions involving Bill of Rights guarantees reached these courts.
Still, courts and counsel did refer to guarantees in the Bill of Rights as
"privileges" or "immunities."
In an 1858 South Carolina case, for example, the federal district
court addressed an alleged denial of "constitutional rights,"
particularly "the privilege of confronting the witness.131  Chief
Justice John Marshall had referred to the right of confrontation in the
same way in the trial of Aaron Burr for treason. Marshall noted that
the right did not apply to certain preliminary proceedings, but "[a]t a
trial in chief, the accused possesses the valuable privilege of being
confronted with his accuser.
3 19
In 1827, Circuit Justice Bushrod Washington considered a
challenge to the seizure of lawful money from a defendant charged
with counterfeiting.320 Washington ordered the money returned,
noting that holding the money would make it difficult for the
defendant to enjoy his constitutional rights. As explained by Justice
Washington,
316. Id. at 514 (opinion of Burnette, J.) (emphasis added).
317. GA. CONST. of 1868, art. I, § 2, in 1 THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONsTITuTIONS,
COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIc LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES 411, 411-
12 (Washington, D.C., Gov't Printing Office, 2d ed. 1878) [hereinafter THE FEDERAL
AND STATE CoNsTruTTIONS].
318. In re Bates, 2 F. Cas. 1015,1018 (D.S.C. 1858) (No. 1099a).
319. United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 27,29 (C.C. Va. 1806) (No. 14,692c).
320. See Exparte Craig, 6 F. Cas. 710,711 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1827) (No. 3321).
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[t]he constitution, by one of its amendments, has secured to
every person under a criminal prosecution, the right to have
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favour,
and the privilege of having the assistance of counsel to defend
him. But what would these securities avail the accused, if a
judicial officer, or any other officer of the court may legally
deprive him of the means of obtaining his witnesses, and of
employing the counsel in whom his confidence is placed; by
detaining the money found upon his person, which, in many
cases, may be his all?3
21
In another circuit court case, Supreme Court Justice William
Johnson used the words "privileges and immunities" as equivalent to
rights listed in a "bill of rights."3 - He considered whether the
Constitution and laws automatically applied to all territories acquired
by the United States. On this issue he gave some weight to the fact
that Congress had passed a special statute setting out the laws of
Congress that would apply to the Florida territory and also setting out
rights and liberties of inhabitants of the territory.3z Johnson wrote,
"we have an enumeration of the acts of congress, which are to be held
in force in the territory; and.., an enumeration, in nature of a bill of
rights, or privileges, and immunities which could not be denied to the
inhabitants of the territory. '34 Among the rights listed in the act
which Justice Johnson cited as "a bill of rights or privileges or
immunities" were "freedom of religious opinions," "the benefit of the
writ of habeas corpus," and protections against excessive bail, cruel
and unusual punishment, and taking of private property for public use
without just compensation?25
One of the most notable uses of the words "privileges or
immunities" by a federal court comes in Scott v. Sandford ("Dred
Scott")?26 In the Dred Scott case, the Court said that every right,
privilege, or immunity under the Constitution of the United States
belonged only to citizens of the United States, a class that excluded
all people descended from African slaves whether or not they were
free citizens of one of the states.3z Specifically, the Court held that
Americans descended from African slaves could not sue in federal
321. Id. (emphasis added).
322. American Ins. Co. v. Canter, 1 F. Cas. 658, 660 (C.C.S.C. n.d.) (No. 302a); see also
AMAR, supra note 22, at 167 (discussing Justice Johnson's phrasing).
323. See Canter, 1 F. Cas. at 660.
324. Id.; see also AMAR, supra note 22, at 167 (discussing Justice Johnson's opinion).
325. Canter, 1 F. Cas. at 660.
326. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
327. See id. at 403-04.
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court.'2 A close reading of the opinion shows that the Court used the
words "right" and "privilege" as equivalent:
Can a negro, whose ancestors were imported into this
country, and sold as slaves, become a member of the
political community formed and brought into existence by
the Constitution of the United States, and as such become
entitled to all the rights, and privileges, and immunities,
guarantied by that instrument to the citizen? One of which
rights is the privilege of suing in a court of the United States
in the cases specified in the Constitution 29
Clearly among the privileges and immunities referred to by the
Court were those protected by the interstate Privileges and
Immunities Clause of Article IV of the U.S. Constitution.3 0 But as
the previous passage indicates, the word "privilege" was used to
encompass virtually all federal constitutional rights. As Chief Justice
Taney asserted, the Constitution "speaks in general terms of the
people of the United States, and of citizens of the several States, when
it is providing for the exercise of the powers granted or the privileges
secured to the citizen. '331 Dred Scott was the most famous (and
infamous) decision of the age. Its reference to federal constitutional
rights as privileges solely belonging to citizens of the United States
illuminates the meaning of the words in the Fourteenth Amendment.
That Amendment made all persons born in the nation citizens and
provided that no state shall abridge the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States.332
Such usage continued in the years immediately after the
ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment. For example, in the 1869
case of Thompson v. Railroad Cos., 333 the Court held that, on
removal, the lower federal court had improperly changed the suit
from one in law (with a civil jury) to one in equity (without a jury).
By the lower court's error, the Court said, "an action at law, which
sought solely to recover damages for a breach of contract, was
transmuted into a suit in equity, and the defendant deprived of the
constitutional privilege of trial by jury. '335 As we have seen, the Court
328. See icL at 403; Shelby v. Bacon, 51 U.S. (10 How.) 56, 61 (1850).
329. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 403 (emphasis added).
330. U.S. CONST. art IV, § 2, cl. 1.
331. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (16 How.) at 411 (third and fourth emphases added).
332. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
333. 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 134 (1867).
334. See id at 137.
335. Md (emphasis added).
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also described criminal jury trial as a "privilege. 36 Another early
federal court decision soon after the passage of the Fourteenth
Amendment explicitly held that the rights in the Bill of Rights were
among the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States
that no state could abridge.337
Counsel also used the word "privilege" to describe constitutional
rights in arguments in federal court. This was so in two famous cases.
In Prigg v. Pennsylvania,331 Prigg was charged with kidnapping and
removing from the state black residents of Pennsylvania who were
claimed as slaves in Maryland. A Pennsylvania personal liberty law
made it a crime to seize and remove black people from the state in
order to enslave them without a prior judicial determination of
whether they were in fact slaves339 The attorney for Pennsylvania
defended the law as protecting basic constitutional rights:
[I]n a free state every man is prima facie a free man who is
at large. If so, he comes under that class called "people;"
and the right of "the people" to be secure in their persons
against unreasonable seizures is guarantied by the
Constitution. Aye! but he is a slave, say the opponents of
this doctrine. But that is not admitted. The very question at
issue is, slave or free. Now, so long as he is not proved a
slave, he is presumed free; and, therefore, if you seize him, it
is a violation of this constitutional privilege 40
In a disgraceful opinion, the Supreme Court of the United States
struck down the Pennsylvania law.341 The decision was disgraceful
336. Exparte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2,123-24 (1866).
337. See United States v. Hall, 26 F. Cas. 79, 82 (C.C.S.D. Ala. 1871) (No. 15,282);
Justice Wood's views in Hall were consistent with those of Justice Bradley, see Letter from
Justice Bradley to Judge Woods, supra note 15; see also CURTIs, NO STATE SHALL
ABRIDGE, supra note 22, at 160, 171-72 (describing Halo. But see United States v. Cosby,
25 F. Cas. 701, 704 (C.C.D.S.C. 1871) (No. 14,893) (excluding the Fourth Amendment).
338. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842).
339. See id. at 550-51.
340. Id. at 579 (emphasis added). Counsel also apparently referred to the rights in the
Bill of Rights as privileges and immunities.
Among the people of this free country, there is nothing which should be guarded
with more watchful jealousy, than the charter of their liberties; which, being the
fundamental law of the land, in its judicial construction every one is immediately
interested, from the highest dignitary to the meanest subject of the
commonwealth. Any irreverential touch given to this ark of public safety should
be rebuked, and every violence chastened; its sanctity should be no less than that
of the domestic altar;, its guardians should be Argus-eyed; and as the price of its
purchase was blood, its privileges and immunities should be maintained, even if
this price must be paid again.
Id. at 571-72.
341. See id. at 625-26.
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because it allowed Americans of African descent-many of whom
were free-to be seized in a free state as alleged slaves (though the
law of Pennsylvania presumed all people to be free) and be
transported to a slave state where all blacks were presumed to be
slaves. This seizure and transportation could be accomplished
without a shred of legal process. The attempt of the state to provide a
trial in such cases was held to violate the Federal Constitution.
Counsel also used the word "privileges" as equivalent to
"constitutional rights" in Ex parte Vallandigharh,342 one of the most
controversial and extensively publicized cases of the Civil War era.
After General Ambrose Burnside's soldiers arrested Ohio Democrat
Clement Vallandigham for making an anti-war political speech,
3 3
Vallandigham sought a writ of habeas corpus in federal court.
Vallandigham's attorney claimed the arrest was illegal, because
General Burnside, a federal officer, was bound by the First
Amendment's protection for speech and press.3" He also claimed a
military trial would violate Vallandigham's Fifth Amendment right to
grand jury indictment and Sixth Amendment right to jury trial. 45
Vallandigham's attorney argued, "General Burnside admonishes us
of a certain 'quietness' which might prevail as the consequence of
enforcing his military order: I answer him that quietness attained by
the sacrifice of our ancestral rights, by the destruction of our
constitutional privileges, is worse than the worst degree of confusion
and violence."3" As the evidence set out shows, in the years leading
up to the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, it was common to
describe Bill of Rights liberties as privileges or immunities belonging
to American citizens.
In a leading scholarly treatise by a famous Supreme Court
Justice, the word "privilege" was also used to describe rights given
protection in the Bill of Rights. Justice Story in his Commentaries on
the Constitution described the Seventh Amendment guarantee of civil
jury trial as "plac[ing] upon the high ground of constitutional right the
inestimable privilege of a trial by jury in civil cases, a privilege
scarcely inferior to that in criminal cases, which is conceded by all
persons to be essential to political and civil liberty."' 7 This passage
342. 28 F. Cas. 874, 875 (1863) (C.C.S.D. Ohio 1863) (No. 16,816). For a discussion of
the case, see Curtis, Lincoln-Vallandigham, supra note 284, at 121-31.
343. See Curtis, Lincoln-Vallandigham, supra note 284, at 121-25.
344. See Vallandigham, 28 F. Cas. at 881.
345. See id. at 890-91.
346. Id. at 880.
347. JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
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from Story was quoted by de Tocquevifle in his discussion of the civil
jury in Democracy in America.
VI. THE THIRTEENTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS
A. Debate on Constitutional Amendments
During the congressional debates on an amendment to abolish
slavery and in the debates in the Thirty-Ninth Congress, which
framed the Fourteenth Amendment, Republicans repeated basic
themes. They asserted that slavery had destroyed the constitutional
rights of American citizens, including rights to free speech, press, and
religion.349 The Republican view was that Southern laws and violence
had violated these basic rights of all American citizens, rights that no
state should abridge. These rights were alternately described as
"privileges," "immunities," and "rights." There are many
examples. 1
Slavery, declared Representative John Kasson of Iowa, "denies
the constitutional rights of our citizens in the South, suppresses
freedom of speech and of the press, throws types into the rivers when
they do not print its will, and violates more clauses of the
Constitution than were violated even by the rebels when they
commenced this war."352  In 1864, before the adoption of the
Fourteenth Amendment, House Judiciary Committee Chairman
James Wilson reflected a change in constitutional understanding that
accelerated after Lovejoy's death.353 Wilson said that
[f]reedom of religious opinion, freedom of speech and press,
and the right of assemblage for the purpose of petition
belong to every American citizen, high or low, rich or poor,
wherever he may be within the jurisdiction of the United
States. With these rights no state may interfere without
breach of the bond which holds the Union together.35 4
STATES, bk. III, ch. 38, § 919, at 654 (Carolina Academic Press 1987) (1833).
348. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 271 n.3 (J. P. Mayer, ed.,
Anchor Books 1969).
349. See CURTIS, No STATE SHALL ABRIDGE, supra note 22, at 34-56 (setting out
examples of the Republican view of state abridgment of various privileges, immunities,
and rights).
350. See id.
351. See, e.g., id at 26-91 (citing examples of Republican views on these questions).
352. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2d Sess. 193 (1865) (statement of Rep. Kasson).
353. See Curtis, Lovejoy, supra note 16, at 1160-84 (describing the political climate
after the Lovejoy murder).
354. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1202 (1864) (statement of Rep. Wilson).
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Slavery had practically destroyed these rights because it
persecuted religionists, denied the privilege of free
discussion, prevented free elections, [and] trampled upon all
of the constitutional guarantees belonging to the citizen....
Throughout all the dominions of slavery republican
government, constitutional liberty, the blessings of our free
institutions were mere fables. An aristocracy enjoyed
unlimited power, while the people were pressed to the earth
and denied the inestimable privileges which by right they
should have enjoyed... by the Constitution. 5
John Bingham, the primary author of Section 1 of the Fourteenth
Amendment, and Jacob Howard, who presented the Amendment to
the Senate on behalf of the Joint Committee on Reconstruction, both
explained the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment as requiring states to obey guarantees of the Federal Bill
of Rights.35 6 As we have seen, in using the Words "privileges" and
"immunities" to encompass constitutional rights of citizens of the
United States such as those in the Bill of Rights, Bingham, Howard,
and other Republicans used words in accordance with a long
American tradition. Their usage of the words "privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States" to denote fundamental
constitutional rights was consistent with common usage that stretched
from the time of the American Revolution to the framing of the Bill
of Rights and other debates in the first Congress to the battle over the
Sedition Act, to the struggle over slavery and its denial of civil
liberties, and finally up to and through the American Civil War.
Their use of the words to denote federal constitutional rights was also
part of a long tradition. They were using the words "privileges" and
"immunities" as American statesmen, lawyers, judges, newspaper
editors, and others had often used them. Their belief that the rights
enumerated in the Bill of Rights were privileges of citizens of the
355. Id. (statement of Rep. Wilson) (emphasis added).
356. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2765-66 (1866) (statement of Rep.
Howard) (explaining that under the Fourteenth Amendment the privileges or immunities
of citizens of the United States would include rights in the Federal Bill of Rights, which
would now be protected against state as well as federal infringement); id. at 2542
(statement of Rep. Bingham) (asserting that the Fourteenth Amendment would protect
the privileges and immunities of all citizens of the Republic from unconstitutional state
acts); id at 1291 (statement of Rep. Bingham) (denying assertions by some Republicans
that the Civil Rights Bill could be justified under federal power to enforce the Bill of
Rights and arguing that a constitutional amendment was required for that purpose); id. at
1064, 1089-90 (statement of Rep. Bingham) (commenting that Barron v. Mayor of
Baltimore and Livingston v. Moore showed the need for the amendment); id. at 1034
(statement of Rep. Bingham) (discussing a prototype of the Fourteenth Amendment).
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United States was consistent with a long and well established usage.
By 1866, the idea that states should not be able to abridge these rights
of all American citizens was similarly widespread. In spite of such
common usage, however, in the few early cases, courts typically
rejected application of the Bill of Rights to the states after ratification
of the Fourteenth Amendment.357
B. The Congressional Campaign of 1866
The theme that the Fourteenth Amendment would protect
fundamental constitutional rights of American citizens was reiterated
during the political campaign of 1866.358 The Amendment had been
proposed in 1866, shortly before Congress adjourned, and it was
ratified in July 1868. In part, the 1866 campaign was a referendum on
the congressional plan for Reconstruction, the centerpiece of which
was the Fourteenth Amendment.3 9 Republicans reminded voters of
Southern denials of free speech and other basic liberties and insisted
that the Fourteenth Amendment would protect the fundamental
rights of American citizens .3  A few examples are worth repeating.
A Convention of Southern loyalists met in Philadelphia after
Congress adjourned,3 61 and it received substantial press coverage.
The call for the convention was issued in July and read again when
the convention met in September.362  The call put the question
squarely:
To the loyal Unionists of the South: The great issue is
upon us. The majority in Congress, and its supporters,
firmly declare that "the rights of the citizen enumerated in
the Constitution, and established by the supreme law, must
be maintained inviolate."
Rebels and Rebel sympathizers assert that "the right of
the citizens must be left to the States alone, and under such
regulations as the respective States choose voluntarily to
prescribe." 6
3
357. See, e.g., Rowans v. State, 30 Wis. 129, 148-50 (1872) (holding that grand jury
indictments are not required); Jonathan Lurie, The Fourteenth Amendment: Use and
Application in Selected State Court Civil Liberty Cases, 1870-1890-A Preliminary
Assessment, 28 AM. J. LEGAL HIsT. 295,303-12 (1984).
358. See CuRTIs, NO STATE SHALL ABRIDGE, supra note 22, at 130-53 (discussing the
years from 1866-1868).
359. See id. at 131.
360. See id. at 171-96.
361. See id. at 133-37 (discussing the convention of the Southern loyalists).
362. See iL at 133.
363. Proceedings of the Convention, N.Y. DAILY TRIB., Sept. 4, 1866, at 1.
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A letter that accompanied the call expressed the hope that
Southern loyalists would at least receive protection for "all
Constitutional rights of American citizens."3" The loyalists' Appeal
of the Loyal Men of the South to Their Fellow Citizens was widely
reprinted in the Republican press." It reflected the loyalists'
understanding that free speech rights were among the rights of
citizens of the United States that states must respect. It said that
"seeds of oligarchy [were] planted in the constitution by its slavery
feature" and had produced monstrous results." The recognition of
slavery
wrung from the reluctant framers of that great instrument,
enabled these [slave] States to entrench themselves behind
the perverted doctrine of State rights.... The hand of the
government was stayed for eighty years. The principles of
constitutional liberty languished for want of government
support. Oligarchy matured its power with subtle design....
Statute books groaned under despotic laws against unlawful
and insurrectionary assemblies aimed at the constitutional
guarantees of the right to peaceably assemble and petition
for redress of grievances; it proscribed democratic literature
as incendiary; it nullified constitutional guarantees of
freedom and free speech and a free press; it deprived
citizens of the other States of their privileges and immunities
in the States .... 367
Republican orators expressed similar ideas during the 1866
congressional campaign. Andrew Jackson Hamilton, a former Texas
congressman who had remained loyal to the Union, had been
appointed provisional governor of Texas by Abraham Lincoln.3"
Before the Civil War, he had been Attorney General of Texas 69 In
1866, Hamilton, a gifted orator, campaigned for Republican
congressional candidates throughout the North. In Trenton, New
Jersey, he spoke on the central issues of the election. Hamilton said
Republicans agreed with Andrew Johnson in wanting the Union
restored. But "althoug [sic] much was said about the Union as it was
and the Constitution as it is," that was not what Hamilton sought.3 70
364. The September Convention, Address of the Committee, PHIL. INQUIRER, Aug. 25,
1866, at 2.
365. See CURTIS, No STATE SHALL ABRIDGE, supra note 22, at 134.
366. Address of the Southern Loyalists: Appeal of the Loyal Men of the South to Their
Fellow Citizens, NEWARK DAILY ADVERTISER, Sept. 7,1866, at 1.
367. !1L
368. See CURTIS, NO STATE SHALL ABRIDGE, supra note 22, at 133-34.
369. See id.
370. The Loyal Southerners, Speech of Gov. Hamilton, N.Y. DAILY TRIB., Sept. 11,
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As a newspaper account of the speech reported,
[Hamilton] wanted a Union of loyal men in which all, even
the humblest, can exercise the rights of American freemen
everywhere-not the least of which are the rights to speak,
to write and to impress their thoughts on the minds of
others.... Any other [Union] than one which guaranteed
these fundamental rights was worthless to him.37'
The need to protect constitutional rights of free speech
throughout the nation was repeated by Republicans again and again
during the campaign of 1866.372 The congressional election of 1866
resulted in an overwhelming victory for the Republican Party, which
had made the Fourteenth Amendment its election platform. 3
C. Congressional Discussion in the Early 1870s
Between 1866 and 1871, Congress had undertaken to reconstruct
the Southern state governments as multi-racial democracies. In 1871,
John Bingham spoke in Congress on "the scope and meaning of the
limitations imposed" by Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment.374
According to Bingham, "the privileges and immunities of citizens of
the United States, as contradistinguished from citizens of a State, are
chiefly defined in the first eight amendments to the Constitution of
the United States." 375 Other Republicans also described the rights in
the Bill of Rights as privileges or immunities under the Fourteenth
Amendment. Representative George F. Hoar, for example, said that
the "'privileges and immunities as used in the fourteenth
amendment' "included "all the privileges and immunities declared to
belong to the citizen by the Constitution itself. '376 Representative
Henry L. Dawes described rights in the Bill of Rights as "privileges
and immunities" and said that the Fourteenth Amendment made
every person born in America a citizen "clothed with them all."'3n
Many other Republicans referred to rights in the Bill of Rights as
privileges or immunities or insisted that the Fourteenth Amendment
1866, at 5.
371. Id
372. See CuRTIs, No STATE SHALL ABRIDGE, supra note 22, at 131-53. As Dean
Richard Aynes has shown in impressive detail, three contemporary legal treatises,
published after the amendment was proposed, supported this reading. See Aynes, supra
note 22, at 83-94; Aynes, supra note 244, at 299 n.67.
373. See 2 ACKERMAN, supra note 200, at 182.
374. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app. 84 (1871) (statement of Rep. Bingham).
375. Id (statement of Rep. Bingham).
376. Id at 334 (statement of Rep. Hoar).
377. Id at 475-76 (statement of Rep. Dawes).
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required the states to respect guarantees of the Bill of Rights.378
Some, like Senator John Sherman, rejected Bingham's suggestion that
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States were mainly
limited to those set out in the Constitution. But Sherman also read
the Fourteenth Amendment's Privileges or Immunities Clause to
encompass Bill of Rights liberties. The Amendment's "privileges and
immunities," he insisted, were not at all limited to those defined in
the Constitution.379 In a 1871 speech to his constituents in Ohio, John
Bingham insisted that no state " 'ever had the right to make or
enforce any law which abridged the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States, as guaranteed by the Constitution of the
United States.' ",380 Still, Bingham noted, basic rights such as freedom
of speech and the right to bear arms had been abridged "'in nearly
half the States of the Union.' ",381 The Fourteenth Amendment,
Bingham said, had remedied this defect?3 "
Even a number of Southern Democrats embraced the definition
of privileges and immunities as including those rights set out in the
Bill of Rights. For example, Representative Roger Mills of Texas
described the "privileges or immunities mentioned in the fourteenth
amendment" as including the right to peaceably assemble, freedom of
speech, press and religion, "immunity" against unlawful seizure and
search, and the right to a criminal jury trial.383 Similarly, Senator
Thomas Norwood of Georgia insisted that the privileges or
immunities protected by the Fourteenth Amendment included all
rights in the Bill of Rights together with other rights protected by the
Constitution. Before the Fourteenth Amendment, he explained, a
378. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app. 310 (1871) (statement of Rep.
Maynard); id at 370 (statement of Rep. James Monroe) (concurring with Rep. Hoar); id
at 382 (statement of Rep. Hawley); id at 414 (statement of Rep. Roberts) (insisting that
the Fourteenth Amendment protected freedom of speech); id. at 499 (statement of Sen.
Frelinghysen) (describing the protection against taking of private property for public use
without just compensation as one of the privileges protected by the Privileges or
Immunities Clause); CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 3d Sess. 1244-45 (1871) (statement of
Rep. Lawrence) (stating that the right to a civil jury trial would be applied to states by the
Due Process and Privileges or Immunities Clauses); CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess.
515 (1870) (statement of Sen. Folwer).
379. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 843, 844 (1872) (statement of Sen. Sherman)
(stating that the phrase encompassed common law rights, those engrafted in the
Constitution, those embraced by English law, and other rights enumerated by the
founding fathers).
380. HALBROOK, supra note 60, at 131 (quoting Hon. John A. Bingham, Speech at
Belpre, Ohio (Sept. 14,1871), in CADIZ REPUBLICAN, Sept. 28,1871, at 1).
381. Id.
382. See id.
383. 2 CONG. REC. 284-85 (1874) (statement of Rep. Mills).
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state "could have deprived its citizens of any of the privileges and
immunities contained in those [first] eight [amendments]." 314 In an
illuminating article on the early interpretation of the Privileges or
Immunities Clause, Bryan H. Wildenthal has collected additional
examples of Democrats who embraced this reading." Indeed,
Wildenthal describes application of the Bill of Rights to the states
under the Fourteenth Amendment as the "conservative, baseline
position" and one that reflected common ground between
Republicans and a number of conservative Democrats.3 8 6
VII. MORE RECENT USAGE BY SUPREME COURT JUSTICES AND
FDR's PROCLAMATION OF BILL OF RIGHTS DAY
The words "privileges" and "immunities" are such a natural way
of describing the rights in the Bill of Rights that the United States
Supreme Court often describes them in that way. That is true both
for Justices in the majority and for those who dissented.
A. Majority Opinions
There can be little doubt that these privileges and immunities are
privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States. The
common understanding of Americans has long been that they have
these rights as American citizens.3 1 Indeed, in his effort to strip
Americans of African descent of each and every constitutional right,
Justice Taney in the 1857 Dred Scott decision had described all rights
in the Federal Constitution as rights, privileges, and immunities of
citizens of the United States and no one else.381 Because the Court
held descendants of slaves could not be United States citizens, it
deprived free blacks of all federal constitutional rights, including
those in the Bill of Rights.389
Many Justices have described Bill of Rights liberties as privileges
or immunities. Liberties so described have included jury trial,
confrontation, the privilege against self-incrimination, the privilege or
384. 2 CONG. REC. app. 242 (1874) (statement of Sen. Norwood).
385. See Wildenthal, supra note 15, at 102-47.
386. Id at 59; see also HALBROOK, supra note 60, at 124-31 (illustrating different
viewpoints on constitutional rights through the debates surrounding certain bills).
387. Of course, at first they were only effective against the federal government,
according to the orthodox view.
388. See Scott v. Sandford ("Dred Scott"), 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393,403 (1857); Crosskey,
supra note 21, at 4-6.
389. See Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 403; CURTIS, No STATE SHALL ABRIDGE,
supra note 22, at 44; Crosskey, supra note 21, at 4-5.
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immunity against unreasonable searches and seizures, free speech,
free press, and freedom of religion.
Let us begin with criminal procedure guarantees. As we have
seen, in 1866, the Supreme Court referred to the right to jury trial as
"the inestimable privilege of trial by jury."39° Likewise, Justice Stevens
has recently referred to "our recognition that 'the inestimable
privilege of trial by jury ... is a vital principle, underlying the whole
administration of criminal justice.' "391 The Court regularly describes
the right against self-incrimination as the "privilege against self-
incrimination" 392 and as a" 'constitutional privilege.' ,,393 In Weeks v.
United States,394 the Court referred to the "constitutional privilege
against unlawful search or seizure.
'395
The Supreme Court has applied the same usage to free speech,
press, and religion. In Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,396 for example,
the Court upheld a breach of the peace conviction of a Jehovah's
Witness who called an officer a "'"damn racketeer"'" and
"'"damn Fascist."' ,397 Because these were "epithets likely to
provoke the average person to retaliation, and thereby cause a breach
of the peace," the Court concluded that the conviction did not
impinge "upon the privilege of free speech."3 98  In Murdock v.
Pennsylvania,3 9 the Court struck down a tax imposed on distributors
of religious literature. It emphasized that the tax at issue was "a
license tax[,] a flat tax imposed on the exercise of a privilege granted
by the Bill of Rights" and referred to free speech, press, and religion
390. Exparte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 123 (1866) (emphasis added).
391. Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 511 (1990) (Stevens J. dissenting) (quoting Ex
parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 123).
392. United States v. Robinson, 485 U.S. 25,26 (1988).
393. Id at 30 (quoting Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 614 (1965)).
394. 232 U.S. 383 (1914), overruled by Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
395. Id at 395; see also Rios v. United States, 364 U.S. 253, 255 (1960) (recognizing the
"'defendant's immunity from unreasonable searches and seizures under the Fourth
Amendment'" (quoting Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 223 (1960))); Wheeler v.
United States, 226 U.S. 478, 490 (1913) (referring to "the privilege of the Constitution
against unreasonable searches and seizures" and against self-incrimination); Interstate
Commerce Comm'n v. Baird, 194 U.S. 25, 45 (1904) (referring to the "4th Amendment to
the Constitution, [as] securing immunity from unreasonable searches and seizures" and
referring to the "constitutional rights and privileges of citizens"); In re Swan, 150 U.S. 637,
649 (1893) (referring to "familiar constitutional provisions for the security of person and
property and immunity from unreasonable searches and seizures").
396. 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
397. Id at 569 (quoting the complaint without citation).
398. Id. at 574.
399. 319 U.S. 105 (1943).
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as "constitutional privileges." 40°  In the 1941 case of Bridges v.
California,401 the Court overturned contempt convictions for criticism
or threatened criticism of a judge in a pending case. The Court noted
that "it is a prized American privilege to speak one's mind, although
not always with perfect good taste, on all public institutions."4°2 In
1969, in Shuttlesworth v. Binningham,403 the Court described the
constitutional right to use streets and sidewalks to distribute
information and communicate ideas. According to the Shuttlesworth
Court,
"Whenever the title of streets and parks may rest, they have
immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public
and, time out of mind, have been used for purposes of
assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and
discussing public questions. Such use of the streets and
public places has, from ancient times, been a part of the
privileges, immunities, rights, and liberties of citizens. The
privilege of a citizen of the United States to use the streets
and parks for communication of views on national questions
may be regulated in the interest of all; it is not absolute, but
relative .... I
Likewise, though he rejected general application of Bill of Rights
liberties to the states, Justice Cardozo, as we have seen,40 5 used the
words "privileges" and "immunities" to describe each and every
guarantee in the Federal Bill of Rights.'0
B. Dissents and Concurrences
Other individual justices have also used the words "privileges or
immunities" to describe Bill of Rights liberties. Of course, some
dissenting justices have understood the words of Section 1-and
particularly its Privileges or Immunities Clause-to require the states
to obey the guarantees of the Bill of Rights. These dissenters,
including Justices Bradley and Swayne, 7 Justice Harlan, 40 1 Justices
400. Id. 112, 113. The reference to "a privilege granted by the Bill of Rights," was
quoted in Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Board of Equalization, 493 U.S. 378,386 (1990).
401. 314 U.S. 252 (1941).
402. Id. at 270.
403. 394 U.S. 147 (1969).
404. Id. at 152 (Roberts, J.) (quoting Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U.S. 496, 515-516 (1939)).
405. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
406. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325-26 (1937), overruled by Benton v.
Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969).
407. See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 116, 118 (1873) (Bradley, J.,
dissenting) (dicta). Justice Swayne joined in the dissent. See id. (Bradley, J., dissenting).
408. See Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 464-65 (1907) (Harlan, J., dissenting);
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Field and Brewer,409 and Justices Black and Douglas,410 describe these
guarantees as "privileges" or "immunities."
Justice Stone, joined by Justices Black, Murphy, and Douglas,
referred to "freedom of speech, freedom of the press, or freedom of
worship, those historic privileges which are so essential to our
political welfare and spiritual progress. '41  Indeed, Justice Douglas
explicitly relied on the Privileges or Immunities Clause in his dissent
in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. 4 12 stating:
The Fourteenth Amendment speaks not only of due process
but also of "privileges and immunities" of United States
citizenship. I can conceive of no privilege or immunity with
a higher claim to recognition against state abridgment than
the freedoms of speech and of the press. In our federal
system we are all subject to two governmental regimes, and
freedoms of speech and of the press protected against the
infringement of only one are quite illusory.413
Furthermore, sixteen years later, four justices described the
Confrontation Clause as securing a constitutional privilege:
[T]he Confrontation Clause serves to afford a criminal
defendant the privilege "of compelling [the witness] to stand
face to face with the jury in order that they may look at him,
and judge by his demeanor upon the stand and the manner
in which he gives his testimony whether he is worthy of
belief.
,414
Nor was such usage limited to justices favorable to general
application of the Bill of Rights to the states. For example, Justice
Reed, who authored the Adamson majority opinion, dissented in
Beauharnais v. Illinois.4 5 Justice Reed noted:
Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581, 612-17 (1900) (Harlan, J., dissenting), abrogated by
Williams v. Florida, 398 U.S. 78 (1970). On grand juries and due process, see Hurtado v.
California, 110 U.S. 516, 539 (1884) (Harlan, J. dissenting).
409. See O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323,361-66,379 (1892) (Field, J., dissenting).
410. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 357 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting);
Old Dominion Branch No. 496 v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264, 290 (1974), (Douglas, J.,
concurring in result); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 165 (1968) (Black, J.,
concurring); Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 69-123 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting),
overruled in part by Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
411. Jones v. City of Opelika, 316 U.S. 584, 611 (1942) (Stone, J., dissenting), judgment
vacated by 319 U.S. 103 (1943).
412. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
413. Id at 359 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
414. Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738,769 (1990) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (quoting Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237,242-43 (1895)).
415. 343 U.S. 250, 277-84 (1952) (Reed, J., dissenting). In that case, Beauharnais had
posted leaflets with insulting characterizations of African-Americans and was charged
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In carrying out its obligation to conform state legal
administration to the "fundamental principles of liberty and
justice" imposed on the states by the Fourteenth
Amendment, this Court has steadily affirmed that the
general principle against abridgment of free speech,
protected by the First Amendment, is included in the
command of the Fourteenth. So important to a
constitutional democracy is the right of discussion that any
challenge to legislative abridgment of those privileges of a
free people calls for careful judicial appraisal.4 6
Justice Frankfurter himself spoke of the guarantees in the Bill of
Rights as "privileges" or "immunities." In Davis v. United States,
417
he spoke of the "'usual privilege to be free of unreasonable search
and seizure.' ",418 Even in Adamson, Justice Frankfurter slipped into
the common usage of the words, describing the right against self-
incrimination as an immunity. He said "For historical reasons a
limited immunity from the common duty to testify was written into
the Federal Bill of Rights, and I am prepared to agree that, as part of
that immunity, comment on the failure of an accused to take the
witness stand is forbidden in federal prosecutions. '41 9 In addition, in
Dennis v. United States,4'0 Justice Frankfurter quoted an earlier
opinion to establish that the first ten amendments to the Constitution
were designed to "'embody certain guaranties and immunities which
we had inherited from our English ancestors' " and were subject to
exceptions.42'
While the Supreme Court and individual Justices have often used
"privilege" or "immunity" to describe basic liberties in the Bill of
Rights, they usually have employed the word "right" or "liberty."
422
That is increasingly true in recent years. Still, the Court often has
under an Illinois statute that forbade portraying "lack of virtue" in members of any race or
religion. See id. at 251-52; id. at 267 (Black, J., dissenting). Beauharnais had done so in a
petition to his city council seeking segregated neighborhoods. See id. at 252; id. at 267-68
(Black, J., dissenting).
416. 1d. at 279 (Reed, J., dissenting) (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
417. 328 U.S. 582 (1946).
418. Id. at 602 (Frankfurter, 3., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Davis, 151 F.2d
140, 144 (2d Cir. 1945) (Frank, J., concurring)).
419. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 61 (1943) (Frankfurter, J., concurring),
overruled in part by Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
420. 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
421. Id. at 524 (Frankfurter, J., concurring in affirmance of the judgment) (quoting
Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275,281 (1897)).
422. E.g., Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 51 (1988) (citing Bose Corp. v.
Consumer Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 503-04 (1984); Baumgartner v.
United States, 322 U.S. 665, 673-74 (1944)).
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referred to rights in the Bill of Rights as "privileges and immunities,"
"constitutional privileges or immunities," and as "privileges,
immunities, or rights of citizens of the United States." Why such
usage is good enough for the Justices, but "strange"423 or "peculiar" 424
and altogether unacceptable when engaged in by the drafters of the
Fourteenth Amendment, remains one of the abiding mysteries of
American constitutional law. The word "privileges" has been used to
describe Bill of Rights liberties by other branches of government as
well.
C. The 1941 Proclamation of Bill of Rights Day
In 1941, in the midst of a world war against fascist
totalitarianism, the United States Congress passed a joint resolution
to establish December 15 as Bill of Rights Day!' As Americans had
done for generation after generation, President Franklin D.
Roosevelt in his Bill of Rights Day proclamation referred to rights in
the Bill of Rights as privileges of Americans. Like many before him,
Roosevelt used the words "rights" and "privileges" synonymously.
As President Roosevelt noted,
[t]hose who have long enjoyed such privileges as we enjoy
forget in time that men have died to win them. They come
in time to take these rights for granted and to assume their
protection is assured. We, however, who have seen these
privileges lost in other continents and other countries can
now appreciate their meaning .... 426
VIII. A CAVEAT
The sources cited so far show that rights in the American Bill of
Rights often were described as "privileges" or "immunities" of
citizens of the United States or of Americans. The usage of
"privilege" to describe a constitutional right, however, was not
universal. For example, in 1868 Thomas Cooley published his
Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations Which Rest upon the
Legislative Power of the States of the American Union.427 Cooley
focused on state constitutions as the primary guarantors of liberty.
He did not discuss the Fourteenth Amendment, which probably had
not been ratified at the time his book was written, though it was
423. Adamson, 332 U.S. at 63 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
424. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 174-75 n.9 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
425. See Joint Resolution of Aug. 21, 1941, Pub. L. No. 77-243,55 Stat. 665,665.
426. See Proclamation No. 2524,3 C.F.R. 272,272 (1938-1943).
427. COOLEY, supra note 86.
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apparently in effect by the date of publication. Cooley sometimes
used the words "privilege" or "immunity" to describe fundamental
constitutional rights. For example, under the heading "Right to
Counsel," Cooley opened his discussion by saying, "Perhaps the most
important privilege of the person accused of crime, connected with
his trial, is to be defended by counsel."' Cooley then proceeded to
survey the history and development of the right. In another context,
Cooley wrote that in "criminal cases ... the doctrine that a
constitutional privilege may be waived, must be true to a very limited
extent only." '429 He referred to a maxim of the common law "which
secures to the citizen immunity in his home against the prying eyes of
the government, and protection in person, property, and papers even
against the process of the law, except in a few specified cases."430 The
maxim, he continued, that a man's home is his castle has been made a
"part of our constitutional law."431 But for Cooley, these usages were
comparatively rare. He typically described liberties in state bills of
rights as "rights," not as "privileges" or "immunities." So as Cooley
shows, while people have often described basic constitutional rights as
"privileges or immunities," it is equally true that often they have used
the word "rights" instead.
Cooley's 1868 Constitutional Limitations seems not to have
addressed the meaning of Section 1,432 but he soon rejected
incorporation,433 a view that is consistent with the Slaughter-House
Cases.434 Cooley later did suggest that free speech was protected by
the Due Process Clause.435
The Texas Constitution of 1866 and the Maryland Constitution
of 1867 referred to "liberty of the press" as a "privilege. '43 6 The
428. Id. at *330.
429. Id. at *182.
430. Id. at *299.
431. Id. at *299-300.
432. See id.
433. See, e.g., JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES, bk. III, ch, 47, § 1937, at 658-59 (Thomas Cooley ed., Boston, Little,
Brown & Co. 4th ed. 1873).
434. See supra notes 7-16.
435. See Everett S. Brown, The Contribution of Thomas M. Cooley to Bryce's
"American Commonwealth," 31 MIcH. L. REv. 346,352-53 (1933).
436. AMAR, supra note 22, at 169. The Texas Constitution provided: "Every citizen
shall be at liberty to speak, write, or publish his opinions on any subject, being responsible
for the abuse of that privilege; and no law shall ever be passed curtailing the liberty of
speech or of the press." TEX. CONST. OF 1866, art. I, § 5, reprinted in 2 THE FEDERAL
AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 317, at 1784, 1785. The Maryland Constitution
provided: "That the liberty of the press ought to be inviolably preserved; that every
citizen of the State ought to be allowed to speak, write, and publish his sentiments on all
1144 [Vol. 78
PRIVILEGES OR IMMUNITIES CLAUSE
Alabama Constitution of 1865 provided that "no person within this
State shall ... be deprived of the inestimable privilege of worshiping
God in the manner most agreeable to his own conscience." 437 The
Georgia Constitution of 1868 described the right to counsel as a
"privilege."438  After listing a number of rights in its state bill of
rights-not one of which was labeled as a "privilege"-the Oregon
Constitution of 1857 provided that "[t]his enumeration of rights and
privileges shall not be construed to impair or deny others retained by
the people."439 A number of other state constitutions, however, did
not use the word "privilege" to describe one or more rights in their
bills of rights. Instead, they typically used the word "right" or
"liberty."' ° Finally, even if the reader were persuaded that most
people if asked would probably have agreed that the liberties in the
Bill of Rights were reasonably described as privileges or immunities
of citizens of the United States (and probability is the most one can
expect the evidence to show as to the original meaning of this clause
and the other great clauses of the Constitution), that would not prove
that other conceptions were not also included by some people-and
perhaps by most.
CONCLUSION
When Justice Felix Frankfurter made it clear that his textual
"common understanding" argument was aimed at the Due Process
Clause and not the Privileges or Immunities Clause, he made a clever
strategic move. Indeed, the Privileges or Immunities Clause should
be an embarrassment for those advocates of original meaning who
also insist that the application of the Bill of Rights to the states was a
recent invention of the Supreme Court. Some, like Robert Bork,
subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that privilege." MD. CONST. of 1867,
Declaration of Rights, art. 40, reprinted in 1 THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTrruTIONS,
supra note 317, at 888, 891.
437. ALA. CONST. of 1865, art. I, § 3, reprinted in 1 THE FEDERAL AND STATE
CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 317, at 48, 48 (emphasis added).
438. GA. CONST. of 1868, art. I, § 7, reprinted in 1 THE FEDERAL AND STATE
CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 317, at 412.
439. OR. CONsT. of 1857, art. I, § 34, reprinted in 2 THE FEDERAL AND STATE
CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 317, at 1492,1493.
440. See, e.g., DEL. CONST. of 1831, art. I, § 5 (referring to the "liberty" of a free press),
reprinted in 1 THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 317, at 289, 289;
MINN. CONST. of 1857, art. I, §§ 4, 6, 10 (referring respectively to "the right of trial by
jury," the "right to a speedy and public trial," and the "right" against unreasonable
searches and seizures), reprinted in 2 THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra
note 317, at 1029,1029.
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have treated the clause as an "illegible inkblot."" 1 In taking this
position, Bork and others have followed a line of attack suggested by
Professor Wallace Mendelson. Mendelson wrote a revised Slaughter-
House opinion holding the clause non-justiciable and suggesting that
it might be unconstitutionally vague.442 In support of this novel
approach, he wrote, "we are [not] aware of any common law, or other
traditional usage, or any dictionary, that elucidates this inherently
obscure and enigmatic terminology." 443
History provides substantial support for a very different
interpretation: the clause refers to constitutional rights of citizens of
the United States and requires states to respect those rights. The
most obvious place to look for such rights is in the Constitution. Our
modem view that the Bill of Rights declares and protects the rights of
citizens of the United States and the continuing tendency to describe
the rights as privileges or immunities are very old and very tenacious
indeed.
An effort to discover a former era's common usage can at best
identify what the Privileges or Immunities Clause likely meant to an
average reader at the time. I think it meant those constitutional
rights of citizens that were recognized by the Federal Constitution.
These rights include those in the Bill of Rights and undoubtedly some
other privileges and immunities as well, such as the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus, the immunity against ex post facto laws, the
privileges mentioned in Article IV, Section 2, as well as privileges
added later such as equal protection. They would, no doubt, also
include other rights less explicit in the text, such as the right to travel
and to immunity from conviction unless the proof satisfies the jury
beyond a reasonable doubt. The suppression of civil liberties from
1830-1860 in the interest of protecting slavery and silencing its critics
provides substantial additional support for this conclusion. It explains
why Republicans, who were targeted for criminal prosecution (or
worse) in Southern states would be motivated to write Section 1 to
protect fundamental Bill of Rights liberties.
Because of the number of people involved, the vast number of
surviving sources, and the plastic nature of language, history can
provide few certainties. It does seem fair to say, however, that the
history shows that the use of the label "privileges or immunities of
441. BORK, supra note 11, at 166.
442. See Wallace Mendelson, Raoul Berger's Fourteenth Amendment-Abuse by
Contraction vs. Abuse by Expansion, 6 HAST. CONST. L.Q. 437,451 (1979).
443. Id. at 446.
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citizens of the United States" was neither a "strange"'  nor
"peculiar""5 way to refer to national constitutional liberties like those
in the Bill of Rights.
Several factors limit our ability to discover common
understanding. These include the very large number of people
potentially sharing any common understanding in 1866-1868; the fact
that most of the discussion of the Fourteenth Amendment did not
focus on Section 1; the fact that most people, in any case, probably
said nothing on the subject of what the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States were; the fact that the words of many
who did discuss the question have been lost; and the fact that at least
some people would not have agreed on a single meaning-although
most probably would have assented to the meaning suggested in this
Article as at least part of the meaning encompassed by the clause.
As a result, we can hope, at most, to reconstruct a probable
understanding. In light of the history and usage recited above, it
seems likely that most people understood the privileges or immunities
of citizens of the United States to include the rights in the Bill of
Rights-rights that are positive rights that states can not abridge. It is
also likely, as I believe, that more and clearer evidence can be
mustered to support this reading than can be mustered for alternative
claims.
Although it is extraordinarily difficult to show with any certainty
how most people understood particular words more than 100 years
ago, we can look at the comparative strength of rival hypotheses. For
example, some scholars contend that the exclusive meaning of "no
State shall ... abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States" was that states could not discriminate based on race or
caste as to certain rights under state law, which rights were
nevertheless subject to repeal or alteration by the states."' Such
scholars cite a few statements by Congressmen that seem consistent
444. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 63 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)
(suggesting that if the drafters of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
intended for the specific guarantees of the first eight amendments to apply to the states,
they chose an "extraordinarily strange" way to accomplish that end), overruled in part by
Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
445. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 174-75 n.9 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting)
(noting that the broad language of Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment would have
been a "peculiar" way to say that the Bill of Rights applied to the states).
446. For readings of the Amendment's Privileges or Immunities Clause as an equality
guarantee, see BERGER, supra note 76, at 30-69; CuRRiE, supra note 85, at 342-52;
NELSON, supra note 70, at 118. But see NELSON, supra note 70, at 123 (stating that
historical analysis cannot settle the question whether the Fourteenth Amendment was
meant to do more than guarantee equal treatment).
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with their view.447 Devotees of original meaning could look for
historic uses of the word "abridge," "privilege," and "immunity" that
supported such a reading. They could look, that is, for people who
read "abridge" to mean discriminate based on race or caste and for
people who read "privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States" to mean certain rights that states choose to provide. They
could then compare the evidence in support of the rival hypotheses
and evaluate any evidence suggesting that one reading was exclusive
of the other. Although we may not be able to prove common
understanding, we can at least come to comparative conclusions.
While use by judges, legislators, and lawyers is important, it cannot be
sufficient if we take seriously the idea that we seek the common
understanding.
Because the Supreme Court has breathed new life into the
Privileges or Immunities Clause, it is natural for scholars and judges
to give renewed attention to its meaning. If the original
understanding of the words of a constitutional text is an important
factor in determining its meaning, then an inquiry into the historic use
of those words in the clause is unavoidable-but the inquiry brings
new legal and methodological problems of its own.
If we look for common understanding and usage of the words
"privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States," certain
conclusions are inescapable. The words were commonly used to
describe rights such as those in the American Bill of Rights. The
rights in the Federal Bill of Rights were often described as privileges
or immunities. These liberties were often described as rights of
Americans, of American citizens, or of citizens of the United States.
There are a great many examples of such usage; the more one looks,
the more one finds. The words "privileges," "immunities," and
"rights" were often used interchangeably. These privileges and
immunities were also typically described as rights and liberties.
Privileges or immunities are rights people enjoy because of a
447. See BERGER, supra note 76, at 30-69; CURRIE, supra note 85, at 345-51; NELSON,
supra note 70, at 115-19. A number of Republicans believed that the Constitution
forbade certain forms of irrational discrimination-such as those based on race, national
origin, and probably origin in another state. Some seem to have found such a right in the
structure of the Constitution; some in an analogy to the Privileges or Immunities Clause of
Article IV, Section 2, which had been held to protect temporary visitors from out of state;
some perhaps based on Article IV, Section 2 itself; and some thought an implicit
constitutional right to equal protection provided such equality. See generally Curtis,
Resurrecting the Privileges or Immunities Clause, supra note 22, at 44-64 (describing
equality views by members of the 39th Congress). For detailed responses to arguments
that the Bill of Rights does not apply against the states, see, for example, id. at 44-67.
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special status. Thus, lawyers are entitled.: to the privileges and
immunities of members of the bar. Similarly, the rights possessed by
virtue of the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment are held by those with the status of citizens of the
United States.' 4 The rights include those national rights listed or
declared in the Constitution, and chief among these are the rights
enumerated in the first eight amendments. Though one can argue
that the First Amendment simply expresses a lack of federal power
and declares no right, by 1866 most people thought the First
Amendment both declared a right and denied federal power to
abridge it.
The ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment with its Privileges
or Immunities Clause suggests that rights in the Federal Bill of Rights
were now to be positive rights that no state could abridge and that
courts could enforce. By 1866, judicial review was an accepted
American institution. Americans were quite familiar with the idea
that constitutional provisions would be enforced by the courts. Other
constitutional limits on the states prefaced by the words "no State
shall" (such as the Contract Clause) had been enforced by the
Supreme Court.49 So a constitutional provision that "no State shall
... abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States" would be understood as setting enforceable limits on state
power in favor of protecting those privileges and immunities.
What to make of these facts is a separate question. The Court
has a long history of applying most substantive and procedural Bill of
Rights guarantees to the states under the Due Process Clause, which
protects all "persons." 450 A change to the Privileges or Immunities
Clause could raise complex questions such as the status of corporate
rights to free speech.45 As a textual matter, full incorporation of all
substantive and procedural guarantees seems harder to avoid under
the Privileges or Immunities Clause together with the Due Process
448. Many of the rights are extended to all persons by the Due Process Clause.
449. See Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 650 (1819).
450. See generally CURTIS, No STATE SHALL ABRIDGE, supra note 22, at 197-211
(reciting the history of application of Bill of Rights liberties to the states). For a recent
critique of the claim that no substantive protections for genuine persons can be found in
the Due Process Clause, see James W. Ely, Jr., The Oxymoron Reconsidered: Myth and
Reality in the Origins of Substantive Due Process, 16 CONST. COMM. 315 passim (1999).
451. Cf Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 180 (1868) (holding that the protections
of Article IV apply only to natural persons and not to corporations), overruled in part by
United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944); Bank of Augusta
v. Earle, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519, 586-87 (1839) (holding that the Privileges and Immunities
Clause of Article IV, Section 2 does not extend to corporations).
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Clause-if one focuses on original meaning. As a result, the Court
would have to confront the application of the rights to a grand jury, to
a civil jury, and to bear arms to the states and would have to weigh
original meaning against reliance by states on contrary Supreme
Court precedent.
The discovery that free speech is a privilege or immunity of
citizens of the United States protected from state abridgement by the
Fourteenth Amendment does not conclusively settle, for example, the
scope of free speech. Americans will continue to argue about these
questions as they have throughout their history. If it continues to
resurrect the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, the Supreme Court will have to decide how to evaluate
the claims of those who hope to use the Privileges or Immunities
Clause as a vehicle to revive (or further revive) Lochner-era
jurisprudence. The idea that the Fourteenth Amendment would
allow the federal judiciary to judge the rationality of all state laws was
far from the common understanding of 1866-1868.
It may be that advocates of original meaning will find the
evidence presented here (and elsewhere) unconvincing. If they do,
they will advance our understanding of their method by explaining
the basis for their conclusions and how the evidence falls short. One
candid answer would be to concede that there is quite a lot of
evidence, but to maintain that it is not "enough" or that it is
insufficiently clear. In that case, if advocates of original meaning wish
to be consistent, they may have to abandon a great many of their
claims about original meaning where the evidence is less substantial.
To embrace original meaning as a key constitutional method, to
equate it to common understanding, to deny that applying any Bill of
Rights guarantees to the states is supported by original meaning, and
to ignore very substantial evidence to the contrary is not calculated to
advance our understanding of the issue. Indeed, denial in the face of
so much evidence may undermine the claim of original meaning to
provide a clear way of interpreting the Constitution.
Still, critics may point to other interpretations. They will find it
quite hard, however, to locate statements between 1866 and 1871 that
explicitly say that fundamental liberties in the Bill of Rights were not
to be protected by Section 1 or to find usage rejecting the idea that
free speech, for example, was a basic privilege of citizens of the
United States. There are many statements that explicitly prove just
the opposite. If the existence of divergent interpretations is enough
to refute a claim of original meaning, then very few claims can
survive. If not, advocates must arrive at methods of weighing
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conflicting evidence that go beyond "did" and "did not!"
When the understandings of so many people count, there will
always be divergence. If unanimity is required, then original meaning
does not mean much. Nor does it seem appropriate to deprive the
Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of
any significant meaning merely because it is difficult to determine all
its possible meanings. As the Court noted in Marbury v. Madison,
"[i]t cannot be presumed that any clause in the constitution is
intended to be without effect."4 52 Text, history, contemporary usage,
original usage, constitutional structure, our ethical aspirations, and
current precedent (to a significant degree) suggest that those rights
set out in the Constitution itself naturally form the central meaning of
the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
452. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137,174 (1803).
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